# Missionary Activity, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence Across Regime Types in Africa*

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**Abstract**

In Africa, missionaries used schooling to gain adherents. We study how historical missionary activity shaped long-run education and political development across regime types. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to Catholic missionaries generated by their territorial administration system. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that proximity to historical diocese headquarters generally led to an increased presence of Catholic missionaries, as well as long-term positive effects on Catholic identity and educational outcomes. The effects on political outcomes vary by regime type. Only individuals exposed to greater historical missionary activity in open anocracies—relative to those in democracies and closed anocracies—are more likely to participate in politics. Moreover, they are also the only ones who are more engaged, supportive of democratic institutions, and disenchanted with the state of democracy and incumbent in their countries.

**Keywords:** human capital; missions; political development

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# 1 Introduction

Education has long been considered "the great equalizer" among members of a society (Mann, 1848). It is considered not only a source of human capital, but also a catalyst and a prerequisite for democratic political participation and civic culture (*e.g.,* Almond and Verba, 2015; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961). As countries develop and there are greater educational opportunities, citizens are expected to be better able to engage in politics both directly by casting an informed vote and indirectly by participating in their flourishing civil society (*e.g.,* Huntington, 2006; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Lipset, 1959).

Yet, despite some initial empirical support for the positive effect of education on political engagement (Apfeld et al., 2022; Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), recent work challenges the causal role that education, and its associated higher socioeconomic status levels, plays in political attitudes and participation in developed democracies (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011; Marshall, 2016).[1]

More importantly, recent literature underscores the importance of accounting for regime type in developing democracies to understand how education affects political engagement (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023). It highlights that education only translates into greater political participation when it both leads to greater interest in, and understanding of, politics and associated civic values, and the regimes that individuals live in provide incentives for political participation. Since in autocracies political participation often reinforces the existing leadership, and in developing democracies there might be little political differentiation across parties (Lindberg, 2007)—limiting opportunities and incentives for meaningful engagement—education mostly translates into greater political participation in opened anocracies.

We revisit this perennial question in political science in the context of Christian

[1]Education is usually considered a bundle variable, as it is associated with other factors often thought to influence political participation, such as civic attitudes, higher income, etc. (Dee, 2004; Finkel, 2002; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995).

missionary activity in the African context. We assess not only whether historical education-granting institutions matter for long-run political engagement, but, crucially, how and why regime types matter to understand how education shapes political development. To understand whether countries that satisfy what is seen as a "prerequisite" for democracy effectively transition to it, we must understand how their educated citizens interact with the political sphere. Even with enhanced abilities for political participation, educated individuals might only participate more if schooling imparts them with civic values and they perceive a positive return from it (Isaksson, 2014).

As Europeans established settlements and colonies worldwide beginning in the fifteenth century, they sought to spread their Judeo-Christian faiths, particularly through missionary activity. Alongside and complementary to their drive to convert the local populations to Christianity, many European missionaries provided Western-style education to local populations and laid the foundations for future educational institutions. In Africa, the presence of missionaries has been found to have positive effects on long-run educational outcomes (*e.g.*, Cagé and Rueda, 2016; Nunn, 2010; Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta, 2015). Alesina et al. (2021) further point to Christian missions as one of the strongest correlates behind inter-generational mobility in educational attainment in Africa.

The institutions that Christian missionaries established not only had long-run effects on education, but potentially also on political development. Whereas Tusalem (2009) and Woodberry (2012), for example, argue that Protestant missionaries contributed to democratic transition and consolidation around the world by establishing educational institutions and imparting civic-minded values, Dulay (2022) underscores the pivotal role of Catholic missions in nation-building in Southeast Asia by building local fiscal capacity and contributing to good governance. Within-country differences in elite's education—often a byproduct of differential exposure to missionary education—further led to divergent sociopolitical outcomes in the long-run (Ricart-Huguet, 2021).

Despite the recent proliferation of studies concerning the long-run consequences

of missionary activity, causal identification has been challenging due to confounding demographic and geographic conditions, and institutional choices. Across the African continent, missionaries settled in densely populated areas where there were fewer environmental and geographic obstacles (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). In addition, the establishment of European settlements subsequently affected the local institutions' degree of inclusiveness and drove economic development (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer, 2007; Ricart-Huguet, 2022). Notably, despite the theoretical reasons to expect significant heterogeneity across regime types (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we are unaware of any work that addresses it.

To deal with endogeneity concerns, we exploit unique features of the allocation of Catholic missionaries across space. Protestant missionary activity was largely decentralized and endogenous to the local demographic and geographic characteristics, while, following the *1917 Code of Canon Law*, Catholic activity was coordinated at the diocese level (Peters, 2001). Consequently, the presence of Catholic missionaries depended highly on the proximity to the diocese's headquarters. We employ a regression-discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits that, within villages near a historical Catholic diocese border, the diocese on which a village landed is arguably exogenous to the village characteristics, and so is the proximity to the assigned diocese's headquarters.

Using respondents from the third to sixth rounds of the Afrobarometer, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses *circa* 1928. We proxy for exposure to Catholic missionaries by using proximity to the diocese's headquarters. The closer a village is to its corresponding diocese's headquarters, the more likely the Catholic missionary activity was. Consequently, individuals living in such border villages closer to their diocese's headquarters should have experienced better educational opportunities, which we argue persist until today. Not only did European missionaries begin imparting education in the region, but they also laid the groundwork for the post-

colonial educational institutions (Cappelli and Baten, 2021; Dupraz, 2019; Feldmann, 2016). Initial spatial differences in education were further reinforced by subsequent investments in education and by civil service recruitment practices that focused on levels of literacy (Huillery, 2009; Ricart-Huguet, 2021).

We estimate the impact of historic educational institutions across various individual-level economic, social, and in particular, political engagement outcomes. More importantly, given the theoretical reasons that point to the importance of regime type in explaining education's impact on political engagement (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we further disaggregate our results on political outcomes across democracies, open anocracies (*i.e.*, competitive authoritarian regimes), and closed anocracies (*i.e.*, *quasi* and full dictatorships), as measured by corresponding country Polity IV scores.

Results from our RDD corroborate that proximity to a diocese's headquarters in 1928 predicts Catholic missionary activity around 1920 only in the corresponding, but not in the neighboring, dioceses. Moreover, such proximity is also associated with modern Catholic identity and various measures of education independent of regime type, which confirms the importance of missionaries in establishing educational institutions. Estimates using data on the location of all modern schools for six African countries further support such importance.

Importantly for identification, we provide evidence that, within the sample of modern-day villages near the borders dividing Catholic dioceses *circa* 1928, the proximity to the diocese's headquarters is arguably exogenous to various factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). We also show that our results are robust to using country fixed effects, addressing the concern that some of the dioceses' borders coincide with country borders, which in turn are not exogenous (Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet, 2024).

Turning to our core results, consistent with our theory, the effects on political outcomes

differ largely based on the regime type. We show that the legacy of missionary education in open anocracies—but not in democracies and closed anocracies—led to individuals being more likely to vote and participate in local politics, as measured by contacting their local councilor and participating in community meetings, and less likely to protest.

To unpack what drives these effects in differential political participation across different regime types, we focus on three types of outcomes thought to be affected by schooling—socio-political status, interest in politics, and civic values—and political attitudes capturing the perceived returns to political engagement. Only within open anocracies did the legacy of missionary education increase citizens' socio-political status—measured by their labor market outcomes—, political engagement—measured by their news consumption, and interest in public affairs—and their civic values—measured by increased support for democratic institutions, while also reducing satisfaction with democracy and support for the incumbent. Within closed anocracies, missionary exposure contributed to stronger civic values, as well as dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent, but it did not translate into greater socio-political status and interest in politics. In turn, in democracies, the legacy of missionary education led to greater relative socio-political status and interest in politics, and somewhat stronger civic values, but not greater dissatisfaction with democracy and the incumbent.

Our results are robust to multiple specifications and sample choices, including considering different bandwidths, adding country fixed effects, considering different samples to address multiple possible concerns, and controlling for two unbalanced covariates. Moreover, we show that our heterogenous results by regime type are not driven by the fact that democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies consistently differ on other observable country-level characteristics, and that differences in such characteristics cannot account for those results.

Ultimately, our results convey and advance two main ideas. First, complementing existing literature, historical Catholic missionary activity had causal, positive long-run

effects on religious identity and educational outcomes. Second and more novel, consistent with our theory, the effect of Catholic missionary activity on political participation varies across regime types. Contrary to early work on the positive association between education and political engagement (*e.g.*, Deutsch, 1961; Lipset, 1959), our findings are concentrated in open anocracies, which offer both opportunities and incentives for educated citizens to participate in politics. In line with more recent work (*e.g.*, Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), these findings reinforce that, to understand how education affects political engagement, close attention should be paid to the regime type where individuals operate.

## 2 The political economy of missions

As Europeans colonized a sizable share of the habitable world, Christian missionaries often preceded or followed them, aiming to convert the local populations. In doing so, they relied on a wide variety of tactics: from forced conversions across much of colonial Latin America to enticements through education in various parts of Africa and Asia. These diverse methods, differing from one colonial setting to another, produced profound and lasting cultural and socioeconomic effects.

Throughout modern-day Latin America and parts of Southeast Asia, Catholic missionaries had an advantage over Protestant ones. Being the state religion of Spain and Portugal, they enjoyed support from the Crown in spreading Catholicism and converting the local populations. In monopolistic settings, education provision by Catholic missionaries varied greatly by monastic orders (Waldinger, 2017). Nonetheless, when education was provided in their missions—such as the case of Jesuit missionaries in America's Southern Cone documented in Valencia Caicedo (2019)—they led to positive, lasting human capital gains.[2]

In contrast, Africa witnessed a significant presence of both Catholic and Protestant

[2]Dulay (2022) further demonstrates how Catholic missions in the Philippines enhanced state capacity and development in the municipalities where they were originally established.

missionaries. There is a notable correlation between the number of Catholic or Protestant missions in contemporary African countries and the predominant religion of its colonizers (Becker, 2021). However, and despite some restrictions (e.g., Frankema, 2012),[3] the colonizing powers generally permitted rival missionaries to compete in their territories, which is associated with better educational outcomes (e.g., Berman, 1974; Gallego and Woodberry, 2010).

While Protestant missionaries were largely geographically unrestricted in their operation, historians and contemporaneous church officials document that Catholic missionaries were organized within the boundaries of their respective dioceses, which were initially set by the Vatican based on the areas of European colonies on the continent. The *1917 Code of Canon Law* exemplified this organization, stating that "the territory of every diocese is to be divided up into distinct territorial parts; to each part a specific church and determined population are assigned [*sic*]" and emphasized that "every cleric whatsoever must be ascribed to a given diocese or religious [institute], so that wandering clerics are in no way admitted" (Peters, 2001). According to Engel (1932, p.12), Catholic missionaries were further told to "[settle] at an important point [. . . ] in the interest of health and consistent work, long distances should be avoided," confiding their activities within their respective diocese's borders. Although these boundaries changed after most countries in the region gained independence in the 1950s and the 1960s, we are concerned with the legacy of the initial, historical distribution of missions *circa* 1928.

It is important to note that there is some disagreement in the literature about the basis for the delimitation of colonial and diocese boundaries established by Europeans and the Vatican—whether these were relatively arbitrary (Englebert, Tarango and Carter, 2002; Hargreaves, 1985; McCauley and Posner, 2015; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013), grounded in existing geographic and population endowments at the time of

[3]For example, Gallego and Woodberry (2010) underscore how the Portuguese allowed Protestant missionaries to operate in their African domains as long as they restricted their operations to a set distance—usually 20 kilometers—from Catholic missions.

settlement (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967), or historical political frontiers and waterways (Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet, 2024). Insofar as country borders might be endogenous, we show that our results are not driven by cases where diocese boundaries overlap with country borders by including country-fixed effects in the robustness section.

In Africa, the presence of both Catholic and Protestant missionaries spurred investments in educational institutions. Although Woodberry (2012) argues that the education returns of missionaries on long-run political and economic outcomes are concentrated among Protestant missionaries because of their stronger focus on literacy, in Africa, and in part due to not wanting to lose out on potential converts, Catholic missionaries also invested heavily in education to compete with Protestant ones (Gallego and Woodberry, 2010; Woodberry and Shah, 2004). Church historians Sundkler and Steed (2000) and Meier zu Selhausen (2019) further underscore how Catholic missionaries had to react tactically to local conditions and rulers in offering schools and health facilities to ensure the success of their missionary work. Importantly, the education imparted by missionaries was not necessarily aimed at the masses or particular nation (identity)-building initiatives (Taylor, 1984), as it was with other education-expansion initiatives in other moments in history (Paglayan, 2020, 2021).

Recent empirical evidence underscores the positive educational effects of historical missionary activity. Nunn (2010) shows that, in Africa, both Protestant and Catholic missions provided education to potential converts—though with varying degrees of engagement between genders—that endure to the present day. Cogneau and Moradi (2014) and Wantchekon, Klašnja and Novta (2015), furthermore, highlight the role of missions in Africa in providing venues to gain literacy and improve economic development. Berman (1974) highlights that, in some countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, upwards of 90% of the student population was enrolled in missionary schools prior to the late 1950s. More recently, using census data to examine inter-generational mobility in educational

attainment in over 20 countries in Africa, Alesina et al. (2021, 2023) show that Christian missions are one the strongest correlates behind such mobility.[4]

Overall, missions had a positive impact on modern-day human capital accumulation, and to some extent, economic development.[5] Although there are recent studies highlighting the positive, macro effects of missions on democratic institutions (*e.g.*, Tusalem, 2009; Woodberry, 2012) and some evidence on their impact on voting behaviour (Cagé and Rueda, 2016), there is limited evidence on the effects of missionary activity on individual political engagement and attitudes. More importantly, and central to our contribution, we are unaware of work that addresses how these effects vary across regime types, which recent literature highlights is of relevance when assessing the effects of education on such political outcomes (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), in a region with such variation in regime types as sub-Saharan Africa.

# 3 Human capital, regime type, and political engagement

A perennial debate in political science concerns how education, and its associated socioeconomic gains, affect individuals' degree of political engagement. Dating back to Mann (1848) and Lipset (1959), education has been deemed a "prerequisite" for democracy and for an active and engaged populace. In the developing world, in particular, early theories on modernization underscore the need for educated masses for meaningful transitions to democracy and political stability (Huntington, 2006; Lipset, 1959).

Education and its associated higher socioeconomic status are thought to be powerful drivers of civic attitudes and a concern for public life (Brady, Verba and Schlozman,

[4]While beyond the scope of this paper, there are many reasons that the literature has explored what is behind the persistence in educational outcomes, including the availability of teachers (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2013), which was one of the main constraints faced by many universal primary education programs implemented in Africa (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017); parental investments (Andrabi, Das and Khwaja, 2012); and occupational choices (Valencia Caicedo, 2019); among others.

[5]Even recent studies that are critical on the long-run consequences of missionary activity for economic growth still highlight their role in fostering literacy and other human capital accumulation (Jedwab, zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2021).

1995; Deutsch, 1961; Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady, 1995). The empirical literature, however, is inconclusive on the causal effects of education on political engagement and democratic attitudes. Although some findings underscore the positive role of education on political participation, broadly defined (Apfeld et al., 2022; Dee, 2004; Kam and Palmer, 2008; Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos, 2004), others question their causality (Marshall, 2016) and whether there is an association at all (Berinsky and Lenz, 2011).

More recent work further suggests that the effect of education on individuals' degree of political engagement in African developing democracies depends on their regime type. Under authoritarian regimes, while educated voters exhibit greater support for democracy, they may deliberately disengage since their participation might have a limited effect in the political sphere or even legitimize the leader by signaling support for the regime (Croke et al., 2016). On the other extreme, in relatively consolidated African democracies where policy differentiation across parties is limited, those who are more educated exhibit greater interest in politics and support for democratic institutions but might see no differential return to participating in politics since there is little margin for changes in policy (Larreguy and Liu, 2023).

Only when democratic institutions are sufficient but not too strong, education increases political participation because not only because they are more interested in politics and have greater civic values, but also they recognize that their political engagement can be conducive to a meaningful political change (Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023). Altogether, this research then highlights that for the increased interest in, and understanding, of politics and civic values associated with education to map into greater political participation, individuals should be in a political context they recognize provides incentives for political participation.

The literature on missionary activity and on how education affects political engagement across regime types then allow us to make several predictions about the long-run effects

of missionary activity on education and political participation across regime types. First, following the extensive evidence on missionaries' attempts to convert the population via offering education, we hypothesize that missionary activity has lasting positive effects on contemporaneous religious identity and education outcomes.

**Hypothesis 1** *Missionary activity led to a persistent increase in religious identity and education.*

Second, in line with the literature that points to regime type as a key moderating factor between education and political participation (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023), we hypothesize that the positive effects of missionary education on modern political participation concentrated among open anocracies.

Open anocracies are high-stakes settings in terms of the opportunity they provide for democratic consolidation and backsliding. Democracies and closed regimes, in contrast, might not incentivize political participation if there is little policy differentiation across political options or even push these individuals away from it as they might realize that there are no immediate returns to participation (*e.g.,* Berinsky and Lenz, 2011) or do not want to legitimize the regime (*e.g.,* Croke et al., 2016), respectively.

**Hypothesis 2** *Relative to closed anocracies or democracies with limited policy differentiation across parties, the effect of missionary activity on political participation is greater in open anocracies.*

Lastly, we investigate what effectively drives greater political participation of more educated individuals in open anocracies relative to democracies and closed anocracies. We hypothesize that, particularly in open anocracies, educated individuals have more socio-political status and interest in politics (Almond and Verba, 2015; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961; Huntington, 2006), which allow them to better perceive the mentioned larger returns to political participation and act on their also greater civic values. In contrast, while in democracies educated individuals also have greater socio-political status, interest in politics, and civic values, they lack differential incentives for political participation, especially when there is no policy differentiation across political

parties. In turn, in autocracies, beyond political participation being quite inconsequential or even signaling regime support (Croke et al., 2016), it is unclear that education maps into greater socio-political status and allows individuals to afford an increased interest in politics and act on their enhanced civic values.

**Hypothesis 3** *Historical missionary activity increases contemporaneous socio-political status, interest in politics, and civic values, as well as perceived incentives for political participation, predominantly in open anocracies.*

# 4 Empirical strategy

This section describes the various data sources from which we draw to capture historic missionary presence, and modern individual-level religious identity, schooling, and economic and political outcomes across regime types, before outlining our empirical identification strategy. Summary statistics for the pooled sample are in Table A1, for democracies in Table A2, for open anocracies in Table A3, and for closed anocracies in A4.

## Data

Our analysis predominantly relies on three data sources: (i) four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys, (ii) historical information reflecting missionary activity in Africa *circa* 1920 and 1928, (iii) data on the location of modern-day schools for six countries, and (iv) data on regime type.

### Afrobarometer data

We draw our main dependent variables from the third to the sixth rounds of Afrobarometer data, for which we have the geographic coordinates for the sampled villages. These surveys sample demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, and measures of political

attitudes and participation, of African adults. Next, we describe our main outcome variables (see more details in Appendix A1).

Our first set of outcome variables concerns religious and educational outcomes, which should capture long-run effects of historical missionary activity. Specifically, for religiosity, we consider an indicator for *Catholic* identity. For educational outcomes, we create an ordinal variable that captures the possible educational levels of a respondent's *Schooling*. Furthermore, we create indicator variables for having *Any Primary* schooling, and *Any Secondary* schooling.

Our study predominantly concerns the impact of historical missionary exposure on political engagement, both in national and local politics. For the former, we use an indicator of whether a respondent *Voted* in the last election and an ordinal variable capturing the extent to which she *Contacted Local Councilor*. For the latter, we consider ordinal variables capturing the extent to which the respondent *Attended Community Meeting* and *Raised an Issue* at the meeting. Recent work by Finkel (2002) shows that these two types of political participation complement each other strongly. In our robustness analysis, we also consider ordinal variables indicating the extent to which a respondent reported *Attending Protests* and offered *Vote Selling*.

Education might lead to greater political participation through increased individual socio-political status, interest in politics, and democratic values, particularly when educated individuals perceive a return from participation. To capture socio-political status and interest in politics in various ways, we first look at whether a respondent is employed (*Employed*), which reflects the market value of her skills. Second, we assess a respondent's interest in politics, as reflected by *Radio News Consumption*, an ordinal variable that captures how often she consumes news via the radio, the most widespread source of news in Africa, and *Discuss Politics*, an ordinal variable that indicates the extent to which a respondent reports discussing politics when with friends and family.

Then, to account for individuals' democratic values, we consider an index that reflects

a respondent's support for democratic institutions (*Support for Democratic Institutions*), which includes ordinal variables capturing the extent to which the respondent rejects one-man rule, rejects one-party rule, agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, agrees that the president has to obey laws, agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and supports term limits.

Lastly, to capture the return to political participation, first, we consider the extent to which a respondent is *Satisfied with Democracy* in her country. Second, we use an ordinal variable to measure how a respondent evaluates the national *Incumbent Performance* and indicator variables for whether she expresses that she feels *Close to the Incumbent Party* or *Close to an Opposition Party*. We see dissatisfaction with democracy (and the incumbent) as an incentive to participate politically.

**Missionary activity**

Our second set of data concerns historical information about the location of Catholic dioceses and their headquarters *circa* 1928, and missions across Africa around 1920. We obtained and geocoded the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and headquarters *circa* 1928 from Streit (1929). We use the data on geocoded Catholic and Protestant missions around 1920 from Nunn (2010). The geocoded dioceses' boundaries and headquarters, as well as the missions from Roome (1924) digitized by Nunn (2010), are rendered in Figure 1.

Using their villages' geographic coordinates, we spatially mapped the Afrobarometer respondents to their corresponding diocese *circa* 1928. Table A6 shows how many different dioceses existed in each country in our data.[6] We then computed the proximity of each respondent's village to their corresponding diocese's headquarters *circa* 1928, the proximity to the closest diocese's border, and the number of both Catholic missions within 50 kilometers, distinguishing between those operating in the dioceses to which the

[6]In Section 6, we conduct a robustness check where we remove countries with only one diocese.

Figure 1: Catholic dioceses' borders, their headquarters, and missions in Africa c. 1928



*Notes*: The gray boundaries delineate the Catholic dioceses' boundaries and the red triangles the approximate location of their headquarters *circa* 1928. The blue circles indicate the approximate location of Catholic and Protestant missions around 1920. **Source:** Streit (1929) and Nunn (2010) (from Roome (1924)).

respondent's village belongs from those operating in other neighboring dioceses.

### School Locations

To investigate the effect of distance to diocese headquarters on long-term education provision, we collect data on the location of schools in six African countries: Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Uganda. We then create grid cells of 0.1 degrees by 0.1 degrees (at the equator, this is about 11km by 11km) and count the number of schools in each cell. We calculate each cell's distance to the closest diocese boundary, the

distance to the corresponding diocese headquarters, and the population density in 1880 (Klein Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen, 2010).[7] We drop grid cells where the centroid is within 5km of the boundary, which are likely to be split by the boundary and therefore not fully in one diocese, and those from the diocese of Zanzibar since the diocese headquarters is located on an island in a different country than the majority of the diocese.

**Regime type**

Lastly, to measure regime type, we use Polity IV data, which classifies countries as democracies if they score higher than 6, open anocracies from 1 to 5 and closed anocracies from 0 to $0-5$.[8] To show how such data meaningfully captures the strength of democratic institutions in our sample, in Figure 2, we restrict to the Polity IV data that overlaps with the Afrobarometer data, and plot the main characteristics from which the Polity IV index draws from to create the regime type classifications.[9] On average, democracies—and to a lesser extent, open anocracies—have established rules of executive succession ("Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment (ER)"), more competition and plurality of representation in executive recruitment ("Competitiveness of ER," "Openness of ER," "Regulation of Participation," and "Competitiveness of Participation"), and "Executive Constraints." Table A5 shows for each country in our data whether in a given year it is classified as a democracy, open anocracy, or closed anocracy according to its polity score. Further, the Polity IV scores show a high correlation with other deomcracy scores such as those from the V-DEM project (Lindberg et al., 2014), whose four main democracy indicators have a correlation larger than 0.6 with the Polity IV score.[10]

[7] This far back population density is imprecisely estimated, but it is the best available measure.

[8] Section A1.2 in the Appendix provides the conceptualization used by Polity IV.

[9] The only exception is São Tomé and Príncipee for which there is no Polity IV data, as it does not meet Polity IV's population requirements to be included.

[10] Unfortunately, given the V-DEM classification and the variation in our data, we do not have enough observations in the "Closed Autocracy" category to rerun our analysis with it.

Figure 2: Characteristics of Regime Type




*Notes*: The Polity IV data is restricted to the observations that overlap with Afrobarometer rounds 3–6, with the exception of São Tomé and Príncipe for which there is no polity IV data. We show the mean of the different variables that make up the Polity IV score by regime type. In parentheses after the variable names, we indicate the maximum score possible based on the Polity IV codebook ("Regulation of Participation" does not have a best score, but a value of three indicates strong sectarian influences and divisions in candidate selection, while a value of one indicates fluid political participation without overbearing favoritism to a particular group). Democracies always have the largest means, followed—for most characteristics—by open anocracies. We include 95% confidence intervals. "E.R." refers to executive recruitment.

## Identification strategy

To estimate the causal impact of Catholic missionary activity, we cannot simply leverage the spatial distribution of such missions across Africa. Missionaries established missionary

settlements around densely populated areas and where settlement conditions were propitious (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967). To overcome this endogeneity, we first exploit that, while Protestant missionaries operated relatively freely, Catholic missionaries were circumscribed to their demarcated diocese and overseen from their respective headquarters (Peters, 2001). As a consequence, the closer to a diocese's headquarters, the more likely the presence of a Catholic mission.

Figure 3: The intuition behind our identification strategy




*Notes*: Two border villages are circumscribed within two different dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese's headquarters than the border village in diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

Second, since the distance to the corresponding diocese's headquarters might be confounded, we restrict our sample to modern-day villages near a Catholic diocese border *circa* 1928. Our identifying assumption is that the diocese on which any such border village landed is arguably exogenous to the village characteristics, and so is the distance to the corresponding diocese's headquarters. Figure 3 illustrates this considering the case of two villages located at the border of two dioceses, A and B. The border village in diocese A is relatively closer to its corresponding diocese's headquarters than the border village in diocese B. As a consequence, the former is more likely to experience the presence of Catholic missionaries.

It's important to note that this strategy does not require the borders to be exogenously

determined. Similar to country borders (Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet, 2024), diocese borders may also be influenced by geographical and historical factors. In Table A7, we replicate Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet (2024)'s test and find that diocese borders are correlated with waterways and pre-colonial state boundaries. In Section 6, we show that our results are not driven by differences in waterways, pre-colonial state boundaries, or other geographical or historical variables.

Our baseline specification is a geographic local linear regression discontinuity design (Keele and Titiunik, 2015) that, inspired by Henn (2023), estimates the causal effect of proximity to the dioceses' headquarters by running the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression within a 10 kilometer bandwidth from the diocese's border:[11,12]

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{i,b,r} \quad = \quad & \beta_1 \text{Proximity to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} + \beta_2 \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} \\ & + \beta_3 \text{Closer to Diocese Headquarter}_{i,b,r} \times \text{Distance to Border}_{i,b,r} \\ & + \mathbf{X}_{i,b,r} + \eta_b + \epsilon_{i,b,r} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,b,r}$ is an outcome of interest for respondent $i$ who is close to a diocese's border $b$ during round $r$, Proximity to Diocese Headquarter$_{i,b,r}$ is the minus logarithmic distance (in kilometers) of a respondent's village to the corresponding diocese's headquarters, Distance to Border$_{i,b,r}$ is the distance of the village to the closest border, Closer to Diocese Headquarter$_{i,b,r}$ is an indicator that the village is closer to its dioceses headquarters relative to the villages in the neighboring dioceses at the other side of the border, $\mathbf{X}_{i,b,r}$ is a vector of respondent-level controls including Afrobarometer-round fixed effects, and $\eta_b$ are border fixed effects. Importantly, the border fixed effects ensure that we only compare observations of bordering dioceses. We cluster our standard errors at the border level.

To ease concerns that our results are driven by a particular selection or operationalization

[11] This specification is analytically the same as using a continuous treatment variable—with a 0 on the side far away from the diocese headquarters and the average difference between the distances on both sides for the side closest to the headquarters—instead of the minus log distance

[12] We show that results are robust to the choice of bandwidth.

of variables or point estimates, we draw inferences based on indexes of (if possible) ordinal variables of interest. In particular, we compute the index using the $\alpha$ command in Stata, which calculates the standardized index for every observation for which there is a response to at least one variable in the index, as well as the Cronbach's alpha for variables in the index.

More importantly, to test our core hypotheses, we distinguish effects on political variables across regime types by estimating Equation 1 for three separate samples based on the Polity IV index of respondents' corresponding countries at the time they were surveyed, which divides them into three broad categories: democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies. In Section 6, we show that our results are robust to removing countries that are within one point of another regime-type classification.

# 5 Results

We now present our main findings. We first show that the proximity to the diocese's headquarters is well balanced across determinants of missionary settlements within the set of villages near a Catholic diocese border *circa* 1928. We then show that proximity significantly predicts Catholic missionary presence around 1920. We next show that proximity had long-run effects on individuals' religious identity and schooling.

We then look at the effect that these missionary-induced increases in educational attainment had on political behavior. Although the positive results on socioeconomic outcomes are consistently estimated across regime types, as predicted by our theoretical argument, the effects on political engagement differ largely depending on the strength of democratic institutions. While the individuals who experienced greater exposure to historical missionary presence tend to be more politically engaged in open anocracies, they are less engaged in democracies and closed anocracies.

To explain this differential effect across regime types, we first show that historical

missionary activity significantly predicts higher levels of socio-political status and interest in politics only in democracies and open anocracies. More educated citizens do not exhibit greater consumption and discussion of political news in closed anocracies. We then show that missionary activity led to higher support for democratic institutions but greater dissatisfaction with their democracy and their incumbent in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. Together, these results highlight how only open anocracies in Africa have both the political resources as well as the incentives for more educated citizens to become more politically active.

## Balance

First, we investigate balance on climatic and geographical covariates. In Table 1, we present the results of OLS regressions using Equation 1 for the pooled sample on various predetermined geographic covariates. We show that the historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters is balanced across climatic and geographic factors known to have affected colonial and missionary settlement (Johnson, 1967). In Panel A, we show balance on climatic and geographic variables known to affect settler mortality. Consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity at the 10% level.

In Panel B, we show balance on variables capturing privileged locations that facilitated access to missionaries (Jedwab, Meier zu Selhausen and Moradi, 2022; Johnson, 1967): distance to historical explorer routes, distance to colonial railways, distance to the closest waterway, distance to the coast, distance to the modern-day capital, and distance to the national border. Also consistent with chance, only one outcome is significantly associated with proximity. In Panel C, we show balance on access to natural resources within 50 kilometers: number of diamond mines, number of oil fields, number of gas fields, and an index of cash crop suitability. Lastly, also in Panel C, we show balance on the gender and age of the Afrobarometer respondents in our sample. Overall, these results lend support to the plausibly exogeneity of the proximity to the diocese's headquarters within the set

of villages near a Catholic diocese border.

Table 1: Balance

| **Panel A:** Climate and Geography | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Precipitation | (2) Temperature Elevation | (3) Log Elevation | (4) Ruggedness | (5) Malaria Index | (6) TseTse Index |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0223 | 0.0441 | -0.203 | -0.132 | -0.145* | -0.0288 |
| | (0.0384) | (0.0482) | (0.131) | (0.0814) | (0.0838) | (0.0777) |
| Observations | 9524 | 9524 | 9914 | 9988 | 10070 | 8926 |
| $R^2$ | 0.937 | 0.911 | 0.855 | 0.580 | 0.882 | 0.758 |
| **Panel B:** Location | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
| | (1) Distance to Explorer Routes | (2) Distance to Colonial Railway | (3) Distance to a Waterway | (4) Distance to Coast | (5) Distance to Capital | (6) Distance to National Border |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0361 | -0.00228 | -0.0717 | -0.288 | -0.529*** | -0.105 |
| | (0.0880) | (0.0483) | (0.0950) | (0.175) | (0.152) | (0.128) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 |
| $R^2$ | 0.907 | 0.874 | 0.819 | 0.805 | 0.796 | 0.824 |
| **Panel C:** Natural Resources | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
| & Individual Controls | (1) Diamonds within 50 km | (2) Oil within 50 km | (3) Gas within 50 km | (4) Cash Crop Suitability | (5) Gender | (6) Age |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.00328 | 0.0798 | 0.0212 | -0.00171 | 0.00326 | -0.0355 |
| | (0.0169) | (0.0535) | (0.0473) | (0.0925) | (0.00310) | (0.0366) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 10070 | 9402 | 10070 | 9964 |
| $R^2$ | 0.922 | 0.712 | 0.855 | 0.570 | 0.000 | 0.061 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' headquarters in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Missionary presence, religious identity and schooling

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence & Religious identity | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Catholic Missions in corresponding diocese (< 50 kms.) | (2) Catholic Missions in neighboring diocese (< 50 kms.) | (3) Catholic today |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0880 | 0.0525*** |
| | (0.164) | (0.0582) | (0.0186) |
| Observations | 10070 | 10070 | 9746 |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.319 | 0.120 |
| **Panel B:** Education | *Dependent variable:* | | |
| | (1) Schooling Ordinal | (2) Any Primary | (3) Any Secondary |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.272*** | 0.0326** | 0.0591*** |
| | (0.0820) | (0.0131) | (0.0202) |
| Observations | 9945 | 9945 | 9945 |
| $R^2$ | 0.232 | 0.191 | 0.236 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## Missionary exposure, religious identity, and education

We turn to whether historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters significantly predicts Catholic missionary activity. In Table 2, Panel A, we present the results for the pooled sample on exposure to Catholic missionary presence. In Column (1), we show that proximity to the diocese's headquarters *circa* 1928 significantly predicts more Catholic missionary activity within 50 kilometers in the corresponding diocese around 1920. In turn, Column (2) shows that, consistent with the rules of operation of Catholic missions that we exploit for identification, this significantly greater activity is solely driven by missionaries operating in the corresponding diocese. In terms of religious adherence,

Column (3) of Panel A shows a significant positive effect of historical proximity to a diocese's headquarters on modern Catholic identity. Overall, these results corroborate that the historical proximity to the diocese's headquarters significantly predicts greater Catholic missionary presence and long-term Catholic conversion.

With regard to educational attainment, Column (1) in Panel B shows that proximity to a diocese's headquarters significantly predicts more schooling, as captured by an ordinal scale of levels of school completion. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel B show that this effect on schooling is consistently estimated when we use binary indicators of any primary or secondary education. Overall, these results are consistent with Nunn (2010), Gallego and Woodberry (2010) and Valencia Caicedo (2019)'s findings on the long-run effects of missionary activity on religious identity and education.

One potential channel through which missionary activity could have a persistent effect on education outcomes today is school construction. Figure 4 shows the strong negative correlation between log distance to diocese headquarters and the number of schools in a $0.1 \times 0.1$ degree grid cell. Grid cells close to their respective diocese headquarters have substantially more schools. Appendix Table A8 shows the RDD results while varying the bandwidth of grid cells included from within 10km of a diocese boundary to 50km. Proximity to a diocese's headquarters is clearly associated with more schools indicating that missionary activity had a lasting effect on the provision of education.

## Political participation

Turning to our main results, Table 3 shows the effects of historical proximity to a diocese's headquarters on political participation across regime types. Specifically, to measure their participation in national politics, we focus on an indicator of whether individuals voted in the previous general elections and an ordinal variable capturing the extent to which individuals contacted a local councilor. Then, for participation in local politics, we look at ordinal variables measuring the extent to which respondents attended a community

Figure 4: Effect of Proximity to Diocese Headquarters of Modern-Day Schools




*Notes*: This figure shows the relationship between log distance to diocese headquarters (x-axis) and the number of schools (y-axis) for all 0.1 × 0.1 degree grid cells in the countries in our sample. Black dots show a scatter plot and orange dots a binscatter. The linear trend is shown in red and the polynomial in blue.

meeting and raised an issue in such a meeting. Results in Panel A, first, indicate that there is a significant positive effect of proximity on the combined index of political participation, but only in open anocracies. In democracies and closed anocracies, the effect is negative.[13]

Consistently, the results in Panel B indicate that proximity leads to an increased likelihood of voting and contacting a local councilor in open anocracies, whereas the effect reverses in democracies.[14] Similarly, in Panel C, the findings show a positive effect of proximity on attending community meetings and raising issues at them in open anocracies. However, this effect is negative in democracies and closed anocracies, albeit only statistically significant in the latter. Altogether, these results indicate that more educated individuals, because of increased historical missionary presence, are more likely

[13]Importantly, results in Panel B of Table A12 indicate that the results on political participation are not driven by vote buying, as measured by whether the respondent reported engaging in vote selling.

[14]Separate results for each of the component variables in Table 3 are reported in Table A9.

to participate in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies, as predicted by our theoretical argument. Moreover, these effects are only present for less contentious political participation since the results in Panel A of Table A12 indicate that the effects are the opposite when considering whether respondents reported attending protests as an outcome.

## Socio-political status, interest in politics, civic values, and political attitudes

The literature on political behavior, particularly in developing contexts, points to two main channels through which education might affect political participation: increased socio-political status and interest in politics, and greater civic values and incentives to participate. Table 4 shows the effect of historical proximity to a diocese's headquarters on outcomes capturing socio-political status and interest in politics. We first measure socio-political status by focusing on individuals' labor market outcomes. We build on the fact that individuals are more likely to be employed when the market values their skills to perform the job they are hired for, which is likely associated with their overall, including political, skills. We also assess whether individuals are more interested in politics, which we measure with their news consumption and whether they discuss politics.

Results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that proximity leads to significantly higher values of a combined index of socio-political status and interest in politics in all settings except closed anocracies. Panels B and C show, separately, that proximity significantly predicts higher levels of employment, radio news consumption, and discussion of politics in democracies and open anocracies.[15] Altogether, these results show that proximity led to greater socio-political status and interest in politics in democracies and open anocracies, while closed anocracies do not offer an opportunity for more educated citizens to gain

[15]The effects on the combined index for news consumption and discussion of politics are sizable, but are only significant when pooling all observations. Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 4 are reported in Table A10.

Table 3: The effect on political participation by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Political Participation | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0252 | -0.0858* | 0.0810*** | -0.0484** |
| | (0.0248) | (0.0445) | (0.0188) | (0.0196) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.203 | 0.193 | 0.173 | 0.249 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Voted and Contacted Councilor | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0144 | -0.0627** | 0.0713*** | -0.00244 |
| | (0.0251) | (0.0282) | (0.0204) | (0.0253) |
| Observations | 9958 | 4651 | 1416 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.110 | 0.111 | 0.162 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Community Participation | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0369 | -0.104 | 0.0909** | -0.0881** |
| | (0.0336) | (0.0666) | (0.0410) | (0.0323) |
| Observations | 9912 | 4635 | 1403 | 3874 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.192 | 0.182 | 0.264 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent Voted, Contacted Local Councilor, Attended a Community Meeting and Raised an Issue. Panel B combines whether the respondent Voted and Contacted Local Councilor. Panel C combines whether the respondent Attended a Community Meeting and Raised an Issue. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A9. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

employment and afford increased consumption and discussion of political news.

In turn, results in Table 5 test whether the differential effect of proximity to the diocese's headquarters on political participation is explained by greater civic values

Table 4: The effect on socio-political status and interest in politics by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index on Socio-Political Status and Interest in Politics | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0457** | 0.0845*** | 0.0739** | 0.0301 |
| | (0.0193) | (0.0308) | (0.0350) | (0.0450) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.132 | 0.145 | 0.159 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Employed | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0186 | 0.0665*** | 0.0320** | 0.00985 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0168) | (0.0136) | (0.0211) |
| Observations | 9919 | 4638 | 1394 | 3887 |
| $R^2$ | 0.098 | 0.123 | 0.122 | 0.109 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Radio News Consumption and Discuss Politics | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0483** | 0.0567 | 0.0765 | 0.0326 |
| | (0.0235) | (0.0397) | (0.0570) | (0.0571) |
| Observations | 9963 | 4651 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.101 | 0.095 | 0.114 | 0.123 |

This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index in Panel A combines whether the respondent is *Employed*, *Radio News Consumption*, and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics*. Panel C combines respondent's *Radio News Consumption* and the extent to which the respondent *Discuss Politics*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A10. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

originating from increased schooling, and increased perceived returns from participation. In Panel A, we show that proximity leads to significantly greater support for democratic institutions in open and closed anocracies, although the magnitude and sign of the effect

is comparable in democracies. In turn, results in Panel B show that proximity leads to significantly lower levels of satisfaction with democracy in open and closed anocracies, but not in democracies. These results are consistent with the fact that there is less opportunity for education to positively influence these outcomes in democratic contexts, where respondents show a higher average level of support for democratic institutions and satisfaction with democracy compared to open and anocracies. Similarly, results in Panel C show that proximity negatively predicts an index capturing views on incumbent performance and incumbent support again only in open and closed anocracies.[16]

Taken together, these results underscore the importance of understanding the drivers of political participation by more educated individuals across regime types, as to better understand the role that education might play in political transitions. More educated individuals might not necessarily participate more in politics unless they have both greater socio-political status, interest in politics, and civic values, and perceive a positive return from participation. Voters in open anocracies are informed of the benefits of democracy and have been instilled with pro-democracy values, but do not feel like the democracies in their countries are democratic enough, and hence they participate in politics to make their societies more democratic. Voters in democracies are well-informed and have civic values but see no differential returns to participating compared to less educated voters. Voters in closed anocracies do not see the returns to participation, and might not be able to afford to act on their civic values.

# 6 Robustness

This section presents the results from several robustness checks. First, we decompose the indexes used in Section 5 and show the results for each component separately. Second, we implement standard checks to test the validity of RDDs, by showing the results using

[16]Separate results for each of the component variables in Panel C or Table 5 are reported in Table A11.

Table 5: The effect on civil values and political attitudes by regime type

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0707*** | 0.0453 | 0.0638* | 0.0499* |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0388) | (0.0357) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.065 | 0.118 | 0.066 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Satisfied with Democracy | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.110** | -0.0226 | -0.0928*** | -0.0907** |
| | (0.0530) | (0.0325) | (0.0237) | (0.0405) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.114 | 0.088 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Incumbent Performance and Support | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0940** | -0.0178 | -0.109** | -0.110*** |
| | (0.0369) | (0.0523) | (0.0529) | (0.0290) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.220 | 0.156 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. The index of *Support for Democratic Institutions* in Panel A combines whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, rejects one-party rule, agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, the individual agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, agrees that the president has to obey laws, agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and supports term limits. Panel C combines how the respondent evaluates the *Incumbent Performance* and whether she expresses she feels *Close to the Incumbent Party* or *Close to an Opposition Party*. Results for each of the component variables are reported in Table A11. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50 kilometers as bandwidth, checking balance on geographic and historical covariates, and providing density plots. Third, we vary the specifications by including country fixed effects, dropping extreme outliers, and controlling for the few unbalanced covariates. Fourth, we rerun the analysis restricting the sample of countries to exclude North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia), kingdoms (Eswatini and Lesotho), and island nations (Madagascar and Cape Verde) separately. Fifth, we run the specification separately for former British colonies (Botswana, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South, Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and other countries. Lastly, we test whether democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies are consistently different on other observable country-level characteristics and show that those characteristics cannot explain our results. Throughout the robustness checks, the results remain qualitatively the same.

Our main specification restricts the sample to Afrobarometer villages within 10 kilometers of the closest diocese boundary. Figure A2 in the Appendix shows the coefficients on proximity to diocese headquarters when varying the bandwidth. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, and 50-kilometer bandwidths are shown. The results remain consistent across specifications, albeit some precision is lost when extending the bandwidth to 50 kilometers.

We show in Section 5 that proximity to diocese headquarters is balanced on a range of geographic covariates. Nevertheless, to make sure that our results are not driven by the combination of these geographic factors that might explain missionary location, we also control for indexes for the three sets of geographic covariates in the second set of coefficients in Figure A3, while the first set of coefficients in the figure show the results of our main specification. The third set of coefficients comes from a specification that only includes the two covariates that are unbalanced: malaria suitability and distance to the national capital. Since many diocese boundaries coincide with country borders, we also include country fixed effects in the fourth set of coefficients in Figure A3. The country-fixed effects specification has the additional advantage that it drops cases where

the boundaries of Catholic diocese coincide with administrative borders. To ensure that our results are not driven by extreme outliers, we remove the 5% of observations with the largest distance to their diocese headquarters in the fifth set of coefficients in Figure A3. Figure A1 provides a density plot showing no discrete change around the cutoff.

Furthermore, we consider different restrictions to the sample. North Africa differs from the rest of the continent in two important ways. First, its proximity to Europe meant that it had a different colonial experience, most notably being exposed for longer. Second, North African countries represented a different religious environment in which missionaries had to operate, namely competition with Islam and the pre-existing presence of Christian communities. Due to these differences, we rerun the analysis after removing North African countries from the sample in the sixth set of coefficients shown in Figure A3. Island nations—Madagascar and Cape Verde—similarly had different geographic constraints that influenced missionary activity. The results after removing these countries from the sample are in the seventh set of coefficients in Figure A3. Third, political participation operates differently in monarchies. We therefore exclude the kingdoms of Lesotho and Swaziland in the eighth set of coefficients. Fourth, Muslim countries might be affected differently by missionary activity. We rerun the analysis excluding countries with Muslim majority population (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tunisia).

Colonial administrations often differed depending on the colonizing country. Specifically, British colonial policy regarding the regulation of missionary activities was often different than that of other, mostly Catholic, colonizers. The next two sets of coefficients in Figure A3 thus show the results separately for former British colonies and other countries. The effects on political participation are bigger in former British colonies, which is consistent with increased competition between Catholic and Protestant missionaries. Next, we remove countries whose polity score was within one of falling under a different classification and the last set of coefficients shows the results when removing countries

with only one diocese in them. Distance to the diocese headquarters might matter differently for dioceses with different sizes. We therefore add a specification where we control for a diocese area. To address the potential endogenous nature of the diocese boundaries we add a "donut RD" specification where we remove observations within 1 km of the diocese boundary. If boundaries were drawn to include certain localities, by removing those close to the boundary we can eliminate this concern. We also drop localities close to diocese headquarters (within 5km).

Recent empirical literature shows that borders are endogenous to geographical and historical conditions (Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet, 2024). When we analyze the relationship between diocese boundaries with geographical and historical variables, we similarly find that they correlate with waterways and boundaries of pre-colonial states. Nevertheless, several tests provide confidence that potential endogeneity of the boundaries does not drive our results. First, our geographic covariates on which we show balance include distance to waterways and distance to coast. Second, our donut RD specifications ensure that our results are not driven by locations just on the border (within 1km or within 5km). Third, in the final three sets of coefficients in Figure A3, we show robustness to controlling for the log distance to pre-colonial states, fixed effects of pre-colonial states, and distance to waterways. Overall, across all specifications in Figure A3, the results remain virtually unchanged. Most importantly, proximity to diocese headquarters being associated with a statistically significant increase in political participation in open anocracies but not in democracies or closed anocracies remains across specifications, as it can be seen in the second Panel. Figure A4 shows the distribution of these coefficients across all our robustness tests.

Next, we test whether the heterogeneous findings across regime types are driven by other country-level characteristics that correlate with regime type. We collect 22 country-level variables covering geographical, institutional, and historical characteristics. We conduct t-tests comparing the mean of these variables in democracies to open anocracies,

as well as democracies to closed anocracies, and open to closed anocracies. Out of the 66 t-tests reported in Table A23 only 2 are significant at the 10% level and 4 at the 5% level, roughly in line with what we expect to occur by chance. Further, the results are not surprising. Democracies score higher on country-level institutional variables, namely the rule of law index, taxes collected as a percentage of GDP, and failed state index. We then take the unbalanced country-level variables (Gemstones, Rule of Law Index, Failed State Index, and Taxes as % of GDP) and split the countries in our sample in terciles of each variable. Figure A5 shows the results when splitting our sample into these terciles instead of democracy, open anocracy, and closed anocracy. None of the other country-level variables show the same pattern as our main results. This makes us confident that our results are not driven by confounding country-level characteristics.

Finally, we consider the relationship between education or missionary activity and political participation outside of the RDD framework. In Table A34 we show the results of simply regressing political participation on respondents education levels (Panel A) and their distance to colonial missions (Panel B). When separating these results by regime type, we see the same patterns as in our RDD analysis: we see strong correlations between education or missionary activity and political participation in open anocracies, but these correlations are significantly smaller or disappear altogether in democracies and closed anocracies. The fact that we see the same pattern in this simple OLS specification as in the main RDD suggests that the findings are not an artifact of the RDD.

# 7 Conclusion

Despite the positive legacy of missionary activity on socioeconomic wellbeing in Africa, consistent with our theoretical argument, our results suggest that its long-run effects on political development largely depend on a country's regime type. More educated individuals, because of the proximity of their villages to the diocese's headquarters *circa*

1928, are more likely to engage in national and local politics, but only in open anocracies. These results are consistent with recent findings on political disengagement depending on the nature of the regime type in Africa (Croke et al., 2016; Larreguy and Marshall, 2017; Larreguy and Liu, 2023).

Concerning for those scholars who emphasize the importance of education for democratic consolidation, such an increase in political participation is not only driven by increased civic values, but also by the combination of increased socio-political status and interest in politics and incentives to participate resulting from greater discontent with their democracy and incumbent. Only open anocracies offer educated citizens the opportunities and incentives to increase their political participation.

Our results underscore the need to pay close attention to regime types as well as to citizens' motives when trying to understand how education affects political participation and, ultimately, democratic consolidation. Future research should also investigate how the education provided by missionaries compares to other policies aimed at increasing education, especially those aimed at the masses and nation-building (Paglayan, 2021). If education is to be deemed a *sine qua non* for democracy (Almond and Verba, 2015; Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Deutsch, 1961), its origins and institutional interactions cannot be overlooked.

Since our analysis focuses on the effects of Catholic missionary activities, the question of whether our results could also be applied to Protestant missions arises. While Protestantism has theological differences with Catholicism and Church-State relations are different between Protestant missions and colonial governments, Protestant missions share a crucial similarity with their Catholic counterparts, namely the widespread use of education to attract converts. Indeed, we find stronger effects in former British colonies where educational effects between Catholics and Protestants was more similar. This suggests that our findings are likely to apply in other context where there were incentives to educate individuals, such as for most Protestant missions.

Lastly, there is a need for more causal work on the macro relationship between historical education institutions on political participation and democratic attitudes. To provide causality, we focus on individual-level estimates, and thus some of our findings should be cautiously extrapolated to draw macro conclusions. For example, the lack of an effect of proximity on satisfaction with democracy in democracies does not imply that, at a macro level, education has not led to democratization or that citizens in democratic countries exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy. In turn, it simply indicates that, in such a context, more educated individuals do not exhibit differential satisfaction. While this is useful for explaining how historical missionary exposure and educational opportunities shape contemporaneous individual political participation, it does not speak to the macro relationship between education and satisfaction with democracy.

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# Online Appendix:

# Missionary Activity, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence Across Regime Types in Africa

# A1 Description of variables

## A1.1 Outcome Variables

Our variables for analyses are coded as follows:

- **Catholic:** Coded 1 if respondent reported she is a Catholic; 0 otherwise.
- **Schooling:** Ordinal variable of the level of schooling attained by the respondent ranging from 0 if she has no formal schooling to 8 if she has post-graduate studies.
- **Any Primary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some primary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Secondary:** Coded 1 if respondent reported having some secondary education; 0 otherwise.
- **Voted:** Coded 1 if respondent reported voting in the past election; 0 otherwise.
- **Contacted Local Councilor:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent contacted a local government councilor in the past year ranging from 0 if never to 3 if often.
- **Attended Community Meeting:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent attended a community meeting in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Raised an Issue:** Ordinal variable capturing the extent to which the respondent has joined others to raise an issue in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Employed:** Coded 1 if respondent reported being employed at least part-time; 0 otherwise.
- **Radio News Consumption:** Ordinal variables describing how often the respondents consumes news via the radio. The variable ranges from 0 if never to 4 if every day.
- **Discuss Politics:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent discusses politics with friends or family ranging from 0 if never to 2 if frequently.
- **Support of Democracy:** Coded 1 if the respondent agrees that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 0 otherwise.
- **Support for Democratic Institutions:** Index of variables including whether the respondent rejects one-man rule, whether the individual rejects one-party rule, whether the respondent agrees that civil society organizations and political parties are needed, whether the respondent agrees that the parliament and not the president should write laws, whether the respondent agrees that the president has to obey laws, whether the respondent agrees that parliament should monitor the president, and whether the respondent supports term limits.
- **Satisfied with Democracy:** Ordinal variable describing the extent to which the respondent reports being satisfied with the way democracy works in her country ranging from if the respondent does not consider it a a democracy to 4 if very satisfied.

- **Incumbent Performance:** An index of how the respondent evaluates the performance of the president or prime minister, their MP, and their local government councilor. Each variable ranges from 1 if strongly disapprove to 4 if strongly approve.
- **Close to Incumbent Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting the party in power; 0 otherwise.
- **Close to Opposition Party:** Coded 1 if the respondent reports supporting an opposition party; 0 otherwise.
- **Attending Protests:** Ordinal variable capturing how often the respondent has attended a protest march in the past year ranging from 0 if not and she would never do it to 4 if often.
- **Vote Selling:** Ordinal variable capturing how often the respondent was offered some something in return for their vote in the last election ranging from 0 if never to 3 if often.

## A1.2 Polity IV Conceptualization of Regime Types

The Polity IV score stems form a combination of a democracy rating and a autocracy rating for each country. Countries with a polity IV score of $+10$ to $+6$ are considered democracies. $+5$ to 1 are open anocracies and countries with scores from 0 to $-5$ are closed anocracies. Below are the conceptualizations polity provides for the democracies and anocracies.

Democracy: "has institutionalized procedures for open, competitive, and deliberative political participation; chooses and replaces chief executives in open, competitive elections; and imposes substantial checks and balances on the discretionary powers of the chief executive" (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 2011, p.9).

Anocracy: "is characterized by institutions and political elites that are far less capable of performing fundamental tasks and ensuring their own continuity. Anocratic regimes very often reflect inherent qualities of instability or ineffectiveness and are especially vulnerable to the onset of new political instability events, such as outbreaks of armed conflict, unexpected changes in leadership, or adverse regime changes (e.g., a seizure of power by a personalistic or military leader)" (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall, 2011, p.9). In Closed Anocracies leaders are only drawn from the elite, while in Open Anocracies others compete as well.

## A1.3 Geographical and Historical Variables

- **Precipitation**: Average rainfall from 1900–1960. *Source: NOAA Physical Science Laboratory*
- **Temperature**: Average temperature from 1900–1960. *Source: NOAA Physical Science Laboratory*
- **Elevation**: Average value of elevation for grid cells of 30 Arc-Seconds (equivalent to 250 meters), measured in meters above sea level. *Source: SRTM version 4.1 (NASA)*

- **Ruggedness**: Averaging the Terrain Ruggedness Index of 30 by 30 arc-second cell. It is measured by dividing the millimeters of elevation difference by the area of the 30 by 30 arc-second cell. *Source: Nunn and Puga (2012)*
- **Malaria Ecology Index**: The index takes into account the prevalence and type of mosquitoes indigenous to a region, their human biting rate, their daily survival rate, and their incubation period. The index has been constructed for 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid-cells. *Source: Kiszewski et al. (2004)*
- **TseTee Index**: The tsetse suitability index calculates the viability of the tsetse fly based on the non-monotonic temperature and humidity requirements for its viability. The index has been constructed for 0.5 degree by 0.5 degree grid-cells. *Source: Alsan (2015)*
- **Distance to Explorer Routes**: The distance of a village from the nearest pre-colonial explorer route, measured in kilometers. *Source: Jedwab and Moradi (2016)*
- **Distance to Colonial Railway**: The distance of a village from the nearest railroad built before 1960, measured in kilometers. *Source: Jedwab and Moradi (2016)*
- **Distance to Waterway**: The distance of a village from the nearest river or lake, measured in kilometers. *Source: Digital Chart of the World*
- **Distance to the Coast**: The distance of a village from the nearest coastline, measured in kilometers. *Source: Digital Chart of the World*
- **Distance to the Capital**: The distance of a village from the capital city, measured in kilometers. *Source: OpenStreetMap*
- **Distance to the National Border**: The distance of a village from the national border, measured in kilometers. *Source: Digital Chart of the World*
- **Diamonds within 50km**: Whether the observation is within 50km from a diamond mine. *Source: PRIO*
- **Oil within 50km**: Whether the observation is within 50km of an onshore oil field. *Source: PRIO*
- **Gas within 50km**: Whether the observation is within 50km of an onshore gas field *Source: PRIO*
- **Land Suitability for Cash Crops**: The fraction of each grid cell that is suitable to be used for growing a cash crop (cocoa, coffee, cotton, groundnut, palm oil, sugarcane, tea, tobacco). It is based on the temperature and soil conditions of each grid cell. *Source: Atlas of the Biosphere*
- **Gender**: Coded 1 if the respondent is female; 0 otherwise. *Source: Afrobarometer*
- **Age**: Age of the respondent in years.*Source: Afrobarometer*

- **Diocese Area**: Surface area of each diocese unit measured in square kilometers. *Source: GIS calculations by the authors.*
- **Population Density 1880**: Estimated population living in a 5 arc min ( $85km^2$ at equator) grid cell in 1880. *Source: Klein Goldewijk et al. (2010).*

# A2 Additional figures

Figure A1: Density Plot




*Notes*: This figure shows result of manipulation testing using local polynomial density estimation from the rddensity command in Stata. Observations with distance to border equal to 0 are removed because for those observations we don't know what side they are on. Our results are robust to removing these observations from the main analysis.

Figure A2: Changing the Bandwidth






*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. The bandwidth is varied between 5 and 50 kilometers with 10 kilometers being the main specification. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each bandwidth.

Figure A3: Changing the Specification






*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. Each panel shows the coefficients for different model specification. "No North Africa" drops Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. "No Islands" drops Madagascar and Cape Verde. "No Kingdoms" drops Eswatini and Lesotho. "British Colonies" restricts to Botswana, Egypt, Eswatini, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South, Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. "Drop Muslim Countries" drops Algeria, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Tunisia. "Diocese Area" controls for the surface area of a diocese measured in $km^2$. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each specification.

Figure A4: Distribution of the Effect on Political Participation Across Robustness Tests




*Notes*: This figure shows the distribution of the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on the political participation index across al robustness tests (individual coefficients can be seen in Figures A2 and A3). Panel A restricts to Democracies, Panel B to Open Anocracies, and Panel C to Closed Anocracies. The effect in our baseline specification is indicated with a dashed red line.

Figure A5: Country-Level Variables






*Notes*: This figure shows the coefficient on Proximity to Dioceses Headquarters on various outcomes of interest. In the Baseline specification the results are shown for the pooled sample, and democracies, open anocracies, and closed anocracies separately. In the other specification, the sample is instead divided using terciles of various country level variables. The 95% and 90% confidence intervals are plotted for each specification.

# A3 Additional tables

## A3.1 Summary Statistics

Table A1: Summary Statistic of full sample

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.60 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 5.38 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.90 | 3.00 | 0.00 | 9.98 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.68 | 1.28 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.26 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.54 | 1.84 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.85 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.02 | 0.69 | -1.70 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.73 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.49 | 0.90 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.09 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.13 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.86 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | 0.01 | 0.65 | -2.07 | 1.41 |
| *Employed* | 0.39 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.96 | 1.44 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.90 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.34 | 1.06 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.81 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.07 | 0.81 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.10 | 1.20 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.35 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 10,070 | | | |

## Table A2: Summary Statistic of democracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.62 | 0.81 | 0.88 | 5.38 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.90 | 2.91 | 0.00 | 9.98 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.33 | 0.59 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.12 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.31 | 1.72 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.83 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.47 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.23 | 0.42 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | 0.05 | 0.68 | -1.66 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.75 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.53 | 0.93 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.02 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.26 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.89 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | 0.02 | 0.65 | -2.07 | 1.41 |
| *Employed* | 0.36 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 3.04 | 1.39 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.92 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.49 | 1.06 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.77 | 0.74 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.02 | 0.78 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.15 | 1.18 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.27 | 0.75 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.29 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 4,711 | | | |

## Table A3: Summary Statistic of open anocracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 1.71 | 0.89 | 0.00 | 5.24 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 4.32 | 3.12 | 0.00 | 9.93 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 0.11 | 0.38 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.13 | 0.37 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.19 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.76 | 1.89 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.85 | 0.36 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.24 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.14 | 0.65 | -1.70 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.68 | 0.47 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.34 | 0.76 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.17 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.00 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.77 | 1.27 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | 0.02 | 0.64 | -2.07 | 1.19 |
| *Employed* | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.99 | 1.37 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.88 | 0.69 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.08 | 0.99 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.65 | 0.71 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.15 | 0.87 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 1.96 | 1.26 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.44 | 0.80 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.57 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.25 | 0.43 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 1,445 | | | |

Table A4: Summary Statistic of closed anocracies

| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 2.91 | 1.08 | 0.04 | 5.27 |
| Distance Afrobarometer to Diocese Border (in km) | 5.12 | 3.03 | 0.00 | 9.97 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km | 1.31 | 1.75 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Cath. Mission within 50 km in Neighboring Diocese | 0.47 | 1.01 | 0.00 | 5.00 |
| Catholic today | 0.28 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Schooling Ordinal | 2.74 | 1.93 | 0.00 | 8.00 |
| Any Primary | 0.86 | 0.34 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Any Secondary | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Skilled Labor | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Index of political participation | -0.07 | 0.69 | -1.66 | 1.61 |
| *Voted* | 0.72 | 0.45 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Contacted local gov. councilor* | 0.50 | 0.91 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Index of community engagement* | -0.13 | 0.91 | -1.70 | 1.45 |
| *Attend a community meeting* | 2.01 | 1.32 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Join others to raise an issue* | 1.85 | 1.31 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | -0.00 | 0.65 | -1.67 | 1.19 |
| *Employed* | 0.41 | 0.49 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *News consumption on radio* | 2.86 | 1.52 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Discuss politics with others* | 0.89 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 2.00 |
| Satisfaction with democracy | 2.26 | 1.05 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Support for democratic institutions | 2.91 | 0.72 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| Index of incumbent evaluation and support | -0.10 | 0.83 | -2.29 | 1.73 |
| *Performance of incumbent* | 2.10 | 1.21 | 0.00 | 4.00 |
| *Corruption of incumbent* | 1.41 | 0.73 | 0.00 | 3.00 |
| *Close to incumbent party* | 0.63 | 0.48 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| *Close to opposition party* | 0.27 | 0.44 | 0.00 | 1.00 |
| Observations | 3,914 | | | |

Table A5: Classification of Countries in Sample

| Classification | Country |
|---|---|
| **Democracy** Polity2 >5 | Benin (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014)<br>Botswana (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Burkina Faso∗ (2015)<br>Burundi (2012, 2014)<br>Cape Verde (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014)<br>Ghana (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Kenya (2005, 2008, 2011, 2014)<br>Lesotho (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Liberia (2008, 2012, 2015)<br>Madagascar∗ (2005, 2008, 2014, 2015)<br>Malawi (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Mali∗ (2005, 2008)<br>Mauritius (2012, 2014)<br>Namibia (2006, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Niger (2013, 2015)<br>Senegal (2005, 2008, 2013, 2014)<br>Sierra Leone (2012, 2015)<br>South Africa (2006, 2008, 2011, 2015)<br>Tunisia (2013, 2015)<br>Zambia∗ (2009, 2012, 2013, 2014) |
| **Open Anocracy** 6 >Polity2 >0 | Algeria (2013,2015)<br>Cote d'Ivoire (2013, 2014)<br>Gabon (2015)<br>Guinea (2013, 2015)<br>Madagascar∗ (2013)<br>Mali∗ (2013, 2014)<br>Mozambique (2005, 2008, 2012, 2015)<br>Nigeria (2005, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015)<br>Zambia∗ (2005)<br>Zimbabwe∗ (2009, 2012, 2014) |
| **Closed Anocracy** Polity2 <1 | Burkina Faso∗ (2008, 2012)<br>Cameroon (2013, 2015)<br>Egypt (2013, 2014)<br>Eswatini (2013, 2015)<br>Mali∗ (2012)<br>Morocco (2013, 2015)<br>Sudan (2013, 2015)<br>Tanzania (2005, 2008, 2012, 2014)<br>Togo (2012, 2014)<br>Uganda (2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2015)<br>Zimbabwe∗ (2005) |

*Notes:* This table shows whether a country falls under Democracy, Open Anocracy or Closed Anocracy according to its Politiy2 score. Countries marked with an ∗ belong to multiple categories depending on the year.

Table A6: Number of 1928 Diocese in Afrobarometer Sample by Country

| Country | Number of Diocese |
|---|---|
| South Africa | 14 |
| Tanzania | 10 |
| Nigeria | 6 |
| Madagascar | 6 |
| Kenya | 5 |
| Uganda | 5 |
| Zambia | 5 |
| Cameroon | 4 |
| Lesotho | 3 |
| Guinea | 3 |
| Namibia | 3 |
| Egypt | 3 |
| Algeria | 3 |
| Togo | 2 |
| Eswatini | 2 |
| Malawi | 2 |
| Botswana | 2 |
| Gabon | 2 |
| Morocco | 2 |
| Benin | 2 |
| Ghana | 2 |
| Mozambique | 2 |
| Mali | 1 |
| Liberia | 1 |
| Sierra Leone | 1 |
| Zimbabwe | 1 |
| Senegal | 1 |
| Cote d'Ivoire | 1 |
| Burundi | 1 |
| Tunisia | 1 |

Table A7: Correlates of Diocese Boundaries

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Diocese Boundary | | | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| Any river | 0.168*** | | | | | 0.150*** |
| | (0.011) | | | | | (0.011) |
| Major (top 10) river | | 0.258*** | | | | |
| | | (0.021) | | | | |
| Any lake | | | 0.311*** | | | 0.267*** |
| | | | (0.021) | | | (0.021) |
| Major (top 10) lake | | | | 0.249*** | | |
| | | | | (0.038) | | |
| Watershed | | | | | 0.066*** | 0.056*** |
| | | | | | (0.013) | (0.012) |
| Pre-colonial state frontier | | | | | | 0.135*** |
| | | | | | | (0.015) |
| Observations | 10,341 | 10,341 | 10,341 | 10,341 | 10,341 | 10,341 |
| $R^2$ | 0.023 | 0.014 | 0.021 | 0.004 | 0.003 | 0.051 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using a OLS specification to determine the correlates of diocese boundaries. The approach is following Paine, Qiu and Ricart-Huguet (2024) by dividing Africa into 0.5×0.5 grid cells. The outcome variable is an indicator if the gridcell has a diocese border going through it. The explanatory variables are indicators for if the grid cell contains any rivers (Column 1), a major river (Column 2), any lake (Column 3), a major lake (Column 4), a watershed (Column 5), or the frontier of a pre-colonial state while controling for any river, any lake, and watershed (Column 6). $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Effect of Proximity to Diocese Headquarters on Modern-Day Schools per Grid Controlling for Population Density 1880

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Schools per Grid Cell | | | | |
| | 10km | 15km | 20km | 25km | 50km |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.354 | 2.695** | 2.321* | 3.557** | 2.816** |
| | (0.361) | (1.249) | (1.193) | (1.597) | (1.392) |
| Fixed effects? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cluster | BS | BS | BS | BS | BS |
| Observations | 679 | 1,373 | 2,066 | 2,746 | 5,851 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.572 | 0.513 | 0.412 | 0.479 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in Equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, indices for geographic controls, and border fixed effects. An observation is a 0.1 $\times$ 0.1 degree grid cell. The outcome variable is the number of schools per grid cell while controlling for 1880 population density (Klein Goldewijk, Beusen and Janssen, 2010). The sample excludes grid-cells within 5 km of dioceses' border circa 1928 and the diocese of Zanzibar. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. $^{*}$ $p < 0.10$, $^{**}$ $p < 0.05$, $^{***}$ $p < 0.01$

## A3.2 Effects for Index components

Table A9: Effect on voted, contacted local councilor, attended community meeting and raised issue

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Voted | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.00103 | -0.0164 | 0.0348** | -0.00256 |
| | (0.00957) | (0.0111) | (0.0162) | (0.0160) |
| Observations | 9921 | 4643 | 1402 | 3876 |
| $R^2$ | 0.109 | 0.108 | 0.106 | 0.126 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Contacted Local Councilor | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0371 | -0.0867** | 0.0717* | -0.00814 |
| | (0.0376) | (0.0346) | (0.0377) | (0.0380) |
| Observations | 9280 | 4403 | 1391 | 3486 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.078 | 0.084 | 0.186 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Attended Community Meeting | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0657 | -0.122 | 0.131** | -0.112** |
| | (0.0462) | (0.0906) | (0.0615) | (0.0477) |
| Observations | 9893 | 4629 | 1398 | 3866 |
| $R^2$ | 0.199 | 0.165 | 0.193 | 0.274 |
| **Panel D:** | *Dependent variable:* Raised Issue | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0342 | -0.152 | 0.105 | -0.124*** |
| | (0.0472) | (0.0924) | (0.0688) | (0.0397) |
| Observations | 9862 | 4614 | 1392 | 3856 |
| $R^2$ | 0.157 | 0.172 | 0.138 | 0.189 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Effect on radio news consumption and discuss politics

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Radio News Consumption | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0762* | 0.153** | 0.0613 | 0.0280 |
| | (0.0410) | (0.0672) | (0.0982) | (0.0827) |
| Observations | 9950 | 4646 | 1417 | 3887 |
| $R^2$ | 0.118 | 0.094 | 0.101 | 0.161 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Discuss Politics | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0289 | 0.00355 | 0.0717** | 0.0320 |
| | (0.0182) | (0.0267) | (0.0315) | (0.0481) |
| Observations | 9852 | 4621 | 1383 | 3848 |
| $R^2$ | 0.063 | 0.057 | 0.097 | 0.098 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Effect on incumbent performance and support

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Incumbent Performance | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0835 | 0.0111 | -0.110 | -0.109** |
| | (0.0562) | (0.0640) | (0.0809) | (0.0441) |
| Observations | 9595 | 4478 | 1351 | 3766 |
| $R^2$ | 0.097 | 0.076 | 0.285 | 0.164 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Close to Incumbent Party | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0721*** | -0.00570 | -0.123*** | -0.0935*** |
| | (0.0223) | (0.0303) | (0.0156) | (0.0187) |
| Observations | 4983 | 2608 | 708 | 1664 |
| $R^2$ | 0.147 | 0.185 | 0.221 | 0.175 |
| **Panel C:** | *Dependent variable:* Close to Opposition Party | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | Pooled | Democracies | Open Anocracies | Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0331* | 0.0168 | 0.0639** | 0.0611*** |
| | (0.0168) | (0.0233) | (0.0302) | (0.0190) |
| Observations | 4983 | 2608 | 708 | 1664 |
| $R^2$ | 0.129 | 0.179 | 0.203 | 0.156 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## A3.3 Additional Outcomes

Table A12: Effect on Attending Protests

| **Panel A:** | *Dependent variable:* Attending Protests | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0117 | -0.0321 | -0.0298* | 0.0230 |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0317) | (0.0161) | (0.0312) |
| Observations | 9726 | 4555 | 1367 | 3804 |
| $R^2$ | 0.033 | 0.038 | 0.040 | 0.037 |
| **Panel B:** | *Dependent variable:* Vote Selling | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0636* | -0.0538 | -0.0859 | -0.0425 |
| | (0.0372) | (0.0445) | (0.0715) | (0.0468) |
| Observations | 5027 | 2270 | 741 | 2016 |
| $R^2$ | 0.122 | 0.155 | 0.111 | 0.149 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using the specification in equation 1, which include controls for the distance to the diocese border and its interaction with the proximity treatment, Afrobarometer-round and border fixed effects. The sample includes all observations within 10 km. of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. *Proximity to Diocese Headquarters* is minus the logged distance of an individual's village from the dioceses' head in kilometers. Standard errors, clustered at the border level, in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

## A3.4 Robustness

Table A13: Robustness: No North African Countries

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.498*** | 0.0547*** | 0.302*** | |
| | (0.171) | (0.0193) | (0.0830) | |
| Observations | 9402 | 9239 | 9280 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.102 | 0.244 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0278 | -0.0863* | 0.0804*** | -0.0534*** |
| | (0.0260) | (0.0448) | (0.0195) | (0.0184) |
| Observations | 9294 | 4652 | 1336 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.193 | 0.170 | 0.209 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0587*** | 0.0852*** | 0.0743** | 0.0738*** |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0311) | (0.0359) | (0.0215) |
| Observations | 9297 | 4652 | 1339 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.126 | 0.132 | 0.148 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0792*** | 0.0451 | 0.0697* | 0.0748*** |
| | (0.0189) | (0.0387) | (0.0347) | (0.00871) |
| Observations | 9243 | 4625 | 1326 | 3292 |
| $R^2$ | 0.074 | 0.065 | 0.121 | 0.069 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.123** | -0.0226 | -0.0933*** | -0.121*** |
| | (0.0522) | (0.0325) | (0.0244) | (0.0229) |
| Observations | 8380 | 4245 | 1174 | 2961 |
| $R^2$ | 0.121 | 0.088 | 0.085 | 0.226 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0840** | -0.0180 | -0.104* | -0.0831*** |
| | (0.0393) | (0.0525) | (0.0543) | (0.0225) |
| Observations | 9052 | 4552 | 1296 | 3204 |
| $R^2$ | 0.085 | 0.086 | 0.209 | 0.131 |

## Table A14: Robustness: No Kingdoms

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.507*** | 0.0445** | 0.265*** | |
| | (0.172) | (0.0185) | (0.0883) | |
| Observations | 8615 | 8305 | 8499 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.747 | 0.122 | 0.242 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0140 | -0.0387 | 0.0814*** | -0.0599*** |
| | (0.0247) | (0.0323) | (0.0189) | (0.0172) |
| Observations | 8515 | 3558 | 1418 | 3539 |
| $R^2$ | 0.201 | 0.191 | 0.173 | 0.256 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0384** | 0.0597** | 0.0741** | 0.0301 |
| | (0.0181) | (0.0223) | (0.0353) | (0.0483) |
| Observations | 8518 | 3558 | 1421 | 3539 |
| $R^2$ | 0.139 | 0.150 | 0.145 | 0.161 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0584*** | 0.00861 | 0.0646* | 0.0453 |
| | (0.0212) | (0.0218) | (0.0363) | (0.0272) |
| Observations | 8454 | 3532 | 1407 | 3515 |
| $R^2$ | 0.084 | 0.089 | 0.118 | 0.072 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.116** | -0.0276 | -0.0928*** | -0.0969** |
| | (0.0559) | (0.0421) | (0.0237) | (0.0402) |
| Observations | 7685 | 3240 | 1248 | 3197 |
| $R^2$ | 0.132 | 0.085 | 0.097 | 0.222 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.110*** | -0.0588 | -0.110** | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0352) | (0.0406) | (0.0534) | (0.0316) |
| Observations | 8309 | 3505 | 1376 | 3428 |
| $R^2$ | 0.100 | 0.090 | 0.220 | 0.169 |

## Table A15: Robustness: No Islands

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.466*** | 0.0512*** | 0.269*** | |
| | (0.167) | (0.0190) | (0.0830) | |
| Observations | 9770 | 9450 | 9648 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.757 | 0.118 | 0.231 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0268 | -0.0860* | 0.0792*** | -0.0486** |
| | (0.0246) | (0.0454) | (0.0191) | (0.0196) |
| Observations | 9663 | 4432 | 1340 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.206 | 0.198 | 0.170 | 0.250 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0421** | 0.0799** | 0.0712* | 0.0302 |
| | (0.0192) | (0.0324) | (0.0343) | (0.0451) |
| Observations | 9666 | 4432 | 1343 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | 0.132 | 0.136 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0717*** | 0.0501 | 0.0617 | 0.0496* |
| | (0.0205) | (0.0399) | (0.0374) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 9613 | 4411 | 1335 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.066 | 0.062 | 0.119 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.109** | -0.0228 | -0.0891*** | -0.0907** |
| | (0.0538) | (0.0334) | (0.0225) | (0.0405) |
| Observations | 8786 | 4081 | 1207 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.111 | 0.073 | 0.093 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0931** | -0.0185 | -0.109* | -0.109*** |
| | (0.0372) | (0.0542) | (0.0539) | (0.0287) |
| Observations | 9420 | 4338 | 1307 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.090 | 0.084 | 0.212 | 0.155 |

Table A16: Robustness: Controlling for Distance to Capital and Malaria Index

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0329 | 0.0822 | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0235) | (0.0696) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9730 | 9929 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.121 | 0.240 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.000603 | -0.0574* | 0.0741*** | -0.00448 |
| | (0.0175) | (0.0334) | (0.0266) | (0.0210) |
| Observations | 9945 | 4636 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.195 | 0.174 | 0.251 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0316 | 0.0667** | 0.0447* | -0.0178 |
| | (0.0238) | (0.0247) | (0.0234) | (0.0334) |
| Observations | 9948 | 4636 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.132 | 0.153 | 0.166 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0189 | 0.0133 | 0.0421 | -0.0141 |
| | (0.0176) | (0.0221) | (0.0376) | (0.0320) |
| Observations | 9883 | 4609 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.076 | 0.068 | 0.123 | 0.073 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0250 | 0.0186 | -0.0874*** | -0.0247 |
| | (0.0224) | (0.0322) | (0.0269) | (0.0533) |
| Observations | 8975 | 4229 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.119 | 0.091 | 0.099 | 0.200 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0677* | -0.0169 | -0.0734* | -0.0737 |
| | (0.0356) | (0.0440) | (0.0406) | (0.0449) |
| Observations | 9687 | 4536 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.092 | 0.088 | 0.230 | 0.156 |

Table A17: Robustness: Drop 95 percentile in distance to DH (581 km)

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.552*** | 0.0606*** | 0.291*** | |
| | (0.170) | (0.0195) | (0.0920) | |
| Observations | 9582 | 9267 | 9461 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.770 | 0.121 | 0.235 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0319 | -0.104** | 0.0738*** | -0.0528*** |
| | (0.0269) | (0.0491) | (0.0243) | (0.0186) |
| Observations | 9478 | 4436 | 1190 | 3852 |
| $R^2$ | 0.206 | 0.194 | 0.171 | 0.249 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0403** | 0.0766** | 0.0568** | 0.0322 |
| | (0.0201) | (0.0344) | (0.0255) | (0.0479) |
| Observations | 9478 | 4436 | 1190 | 3852 |
| $R^2$ | 0.133 | 0.136 | 0.164 | 0.158 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0757*** | 0.0563 | 0.0594 | 0.0505* |
| | (0.0209) | (0.0394) | (0.0435) | (0.0265) |
| Observations | 9414 | 4409 | 1177 | 3828 |
| $R^2$ | 0.068 | 0.068 | 0.119 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.121** | -0.0357 | -0.112*** | -0.0878** |
| | (0.0578) | (0.0366) | (0.0323) | (0.0417) |
| Observations | 8556 | 4038 | 1051 | 3467 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.091 | 0.108 | 0.199 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0908** | -0.0125 | -0.107** | -0.110*** |
| | (0.0404) | (0.0649) | (0.0432) | (0.0319) |
| Observations | 9224 | 4336 | 1150 | 3738 |
| $R^2$ | 0.090 | 0.084 | 0.236 | 0.157 |

## Table A18: Robustness: 5 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.363*** | 0.0514** | 0.222*** | |
| | (0.122) | (0.0236) | (0.0596) | |
| Observations | 4619 | 4464 | 4571 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.710 | 0.127 | 0.251 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0441 | -0.109*** | 0.105*** | -0.102*** |
| | (0.0306) | (0.0258) | (0.0209) | (0.0253) |
| Observations | 4580 | 2207 | 748 | 1625 |
| $R^2$ | 0.223 | 0.226 | 0.192 | 0.292 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0421* | 0.0832 | 0.0919*** | 0.0413 |
| | (0.0214) | (0.0497) | (0.0284) | (0.0458) |
| Observations | 4580 | 2207 | 748 | 1625 |
| $R^2$ | 0.106 | 0.104 | 0.139 | 0.157 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0821*** | 0.0402 | 0.0822 | 0.0551 |
| | (0.0284) | (0.0449) | (0.0487) | (0.0379) |
| Observations | 4553 | 2194 | 738 | 1621 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.052 | 0.131 | 0.089 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.152* | -0.0591 | -0.139** | -0.129* |
| | (0.0769) | (0.0426) | (0.0644) | (0.0626) |
| Observations | 4140 | 1988 | 682 | 1470 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.116 | 0.125 | 0.218 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.134** | -0.0964 | -0.119 | -0.143** |
| | (0.0520) | (0.0831) | (0.0716) | (0.0579) |
| Observations | 4451 | 2158 | 720 | 1573 |
| $R^2$ | 0.102 | 0.100 | 0.226 | 0.160 |

## Table A19: Robustness: 15 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.542*** | 0.0419** | 0.313*** | |
| | (0.201) | (0.0176) | (0.0893) | |
| Observations | 13764 | 13359 | 13602 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.758 | 0.113 | 0.243 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0425* | -0.0970*** | 0.0778*** | -0.0672*** |
| | (0.0233) | (0.0359) | (0.0222) | (0.0130) |
| Observations | 13626 | 6528 | 1755 | 5343 |
| $R^2$ | 0.197 | 0.193 | 0.180 | 0.230 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0428** | 0.0747** | 0.0411 | 0.0444 |
| | (0.0180) | (0.0324) | (0.0309) | (0.0349) |
| Observations | 13629 | 6528 | 1758 | 5343 |
| $R^2$ | 0.135 | 0.140 | 0.131 | 0.160 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0771*** | 0.0573* | 0.0547* | 0.0695*** |
| | (0.0198) | (0.0327) | (0.0313) | (0.0197) |
| Observations | 13533 | 6485 | 1739 | 5309 |
| $R^2$ | 0.064 | 0.060 | 0.122 | 0.068 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.129*** | -0.0239 | -0.0884*** | -0.129*** |
| | (0.0426) | (0.0276) | (0.0292) | (0.0334) |
| Observations | 12274 | 5948 | 1556 | 4770 |
| $R^2$ | 0.113 | 0.093 | 0.105 | 0.201 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.118*** | -0.0442 | -0.108* | -0.125*** |
| | (0.0369) | (0.0599) | (0.0551) | (0.0231) |
| Observations | 13308 | 6403 | 1711 | 5194 |
| $R^2$ | 0.087 | 0.082 | 0.225 | 0.145 |

## Table A20: Robustness: 20 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.482** | 0.0295 | 0.277*** | |
| | (0.195) | (0.0209) | (0.0873) | |
| Observations | 19313 | 18733 | 19067 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.730 | 0.111 | 0.269 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0222 | -0.0643** | 0.0551* | -0.0545*** |
| | (0.0235) | (0.0279) | (0.0274) | (0.0160) |
| Observations | 19102 | 9844 | 2441 | 6817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.195 | 0.187 | 0.179 | 0.220 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0371** | 0.0734** | 0.0272 | 0.0448 |
| | (0.0182) | (0.0304) | (0.0251) | (0.0293) |
| Observations | 19107 | 9844 | 2446 | 6817 |
| $R^2$ | 0.137 | 0.150 | 0.125 | 0.153 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0628*** | 0.0411 | 0.0459 | 0.0588** |
| | (0.0197) | (0.0295) | (0.0321) | (0.0224) |
| Observations | 18966 | 9786 | 2411 | 6769 |
| $R^2$ | 0.059 | 0.053 | 0.109 | 0.073 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.102** | -0.00796 | -0.106*** | -0.112*** |
| | (0.0488) | (0.0369) | (0.0310) | (0.0307) |
| Observations | 17195 | 8963 | 2177 | 6054 |
| $R^2$ | 0.105 | 0.083 | 0.107 | 0.199 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.124*** | -0.0555 | -0.156** | -0.106*** |
| | (0.0357) | (0.0521) | (0.0623) | (0.0211) |
| Observations | 18649 | 9655 | 2387 | 6607 |
| $R^2$ | 0.088 | 0.100 | 0.201 | 0.132 |

## Table A21: Robustness: 25 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.533** | 0.0275 | 0.264*** | |
| | (0.224) | (0.0169) | (0.0846) | |
| Observations | 22968 | 22313 | 22677 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.692 | 0.109 | 0.272 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0119 | -0.0448* | 0.0589* | -0.0452*** |
| | (0.0232) | (0.0227) | (0.0300) | (0.0116) |
| Observations | 22718 | 11814 | 3102 | 7802 |
| $R^2$ | 0.188 | 0.175 | 0.178 | 0.212 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0377** | 0.0563* | 0.0237 | 0.0594** |
| | (0.0183) | (0.0293) | (0.0227) | (0.0258) |
| Observations | 22723 | 11814 | 3107 | 7802 |
| $R^2$ | 0.138 | 0.152 | 0.129 | 0.149 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0677*** | 0.0400 | 0.0707** | 0.0580*** |
| | (0.0181) | (0.0277) | (0.0298) | (0.0193) |
| Observations | 22544 | 11742 | 3052 | 7750 |
| $R^2$ | 0.059 | 0.053 | 0.106 | 0.065 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0913* | 0.00497 | -0.0947** | -0.127*** |
| | (0.0496) | (0.0525) | (0.0363) | (0.0269) |
| Observations | 20436 | 10740 | 2775 | 6921 |
| $R^2$ | 0.101 | 0.080 | 0.086 | 0.200 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.120*** | -0.0521 | -0.171** | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0294) | (0.0521) | (0.0660) | (0.0184) |
| Observations | 22203 | 11587 | 3039 | 7577 |
| $R^2$ | 0.081 | 0.100 | 0.168 | 0.125 |

## Table A22: Robustness: 50 km Bandwidth

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.415*** | 0.0122 | 0.205*** | |
| | (0.158) | (0.0105) | (0.0686) | |
| Observations | 46657 | 45507 | 46152 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.604 | 0.108 | 0.254 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0241 | -0.0384** | 0.00896 | -0.0516*** |
| | (0.0155) | (0.0156) | (0.0475) | (0.00898) |
| Observations | 46222 | 25625 | 6541 | 14056 |
| $R^2$ | 0.185 | 0.181 | 0.177 | 0.206 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0104 | 0.0161 | -0.00138 | 0.0259 |
| | (0.0132) | (0.0233) | (0.0169) | (0.0190) |
| Observations | 46232 | 25628 | 6546 | 14058 |
| $R^2$ | 0.128 | 0.132 | 0.149 | 0.141 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0411*** | 0.0317** | 0.0374 | 0.0293* |
| | (0.0140) | (0.0158) | (0.0445) | (0.0171) |
| Observations | 45939 | 25505 | 6451 | 13983 |
| $R^2$ | 0.058 | 0.061 | 0.089 | 0.061 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0697** | -0.00647 | -0.131* | -0.108*** |
| | (0.0317) | (0.0263) | (0.0665) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 41694 | 23549 | 5907 | 12238 |
| $R^2$ | 0.100 | 0.072 | 0.087 | 0.187 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0862*** | -0.0110 | -0.202*** | -0.0996*** |
| | (0.0268) | (0.0262) | (0.0720) | (0.0241) |
| Observations | 45301 | 25200 | 6397 | 13704 |
| $R^2$ | 0.072 | 0.082 | 0.182 | 0.116 |

Table A23: Covariate Balance—Country-Level Variables

| | Democracies | | Open Anocracies | | Closed Anocracies | | P-value | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Covariates (country level)** | **N** | **Mean** | **N** | **Mean** | **N** | **Mean** | **D. vs. O-A.** | **D. vs. C-A.** | **O-A. vs. C-A.** |
| Historical Centralization | 17 | 0.21 | 10 | 0.15 | 11 | 0.23 | 0.59 | 0.86 | 0.49 |
| Year of Independence | 20 | 1955 | 10 | 1964 | 11 | 1959 | 0.24 | 0.66 | 0.32 |
| Violent Independence? | 20 | 0.25 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.27 | 0.79 | 0.90 | 0.90 |
| Slave Exports | 20 | 195,801 | 10 | 413,393 | 11 | 251,987 | 0.34 | 0.68 | 0.49 |
| Population in 1400 | 20 | 448,714 | 10 | 1,144,463 | 11 | 1,441,215 | 0.24 | 0.04 | 0.67 |
| Log Settler Mortality | 14 | 5.45 | 7 | 6.36 | 9 | 5.57 | 0.14 | 0.84 | 0.21 |
| British Colony | 20 | 0.5 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.55 | 0.31 | 0.82 | 0.28 |
| British Legal Origins | 20 | 0.5 | 10 | 0.3 | 11 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.82 | 0.49 |
| Settler Colony | 20 | 0.2 | 10 | 0.4 | 11 | 0.09 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 0.12 |
| Colonial Railroads (km) | 20 | 579 | 10 | 1,147 | 11 | 1,088 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 0.91 |
| Gemstones | 20 | 22,475 | 10 | 1,420 | 11 | 942 | 0.11 | 0.10* | 0.66 |
| Soil Quality | 20 | 34.53 | 10 | 32.45 | 11 | 35.07 | 0.79 | 0.94 | 0.77 |
| Average Distance to Coast | 20 | 26.21 | 10 | 16.46 | 11 | 12.30 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.58 |
| Land area (1000 Ha) | 20 | 41,346 | 10 | 78,323 | 11 | 66,530 | 0.13 | 0.29 | 0.69 |
| Ruggedness | 20 | 1.01 | 10 | 0.57 | 11 | 0.96 | 0.19 | 0.91 | 0.22 |
| Oil Production in 2000 | 20 | 220 | 10 | 17,046 | 11 | 4,561 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 0.32 |
| Malaria Suitability | 18 | 11.47 | 10 | 12.28 | 11 | 10.70 | 0.80 | 0.84 | 0.68 |
| Rule of Law | 20 | -0.38 | 10 | -0.86 | 11 | -0.62 | 0.02** | 0.31 | 0.19 |
| GDP 1950 | 20 | 956 | 10 | 1,047 | 11 | 718 | 0.76 | 0.19 | 0.24 |
| Failed State Index 2006 | 17 | 76.45 | 9 | 87.99 | 10 | 90.1 | 0.09* | 0.02** | 0.75 |
| Taxes as % of GDP 2010 | 14 | 17.39 | 6 | 12.78 | 8 | 13.61 | 0.04** | 0.14 | 0.71 |
| Political Decentralization | 13 | 2.05 | 8 | 2.21 | 6 | 1.94 | 0.71 | 0.84 | 0.57 |

## Table A24: Robustness: Only Former British Colonies

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.321 | 0.0507* | 0.259** | |
| | (0.236) | (0.0286) | (0.122) | |
| Observations | 7394 | 7119 | 7312 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.772 | 0.129 | 0.207 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0319 | -0.0804 | 0.0773*** | -0.0408 |
| | (0.0302) | (0.0477) | (0.0211) | (0.0417) |
| Observations | 7319 | 3505 | 844 | 2970 |
| $R^2$ | 0.233 | 0.218 | 0.167 | 0.265 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0569** | 0.0954** | 0.0496** | -0.0168 |
| | (0.0277) | (0.0355) | (0.0202) | (0.0527) |
| Observations | 7319 | 3505 | 844 | 2970 |
| $R^2$ | 0.134 | 0.128 | 0.159 | 0.166 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0457* | 0.0563 | 0.0747* | 0.0193 |
| | (0.0241) | (0.0419) | (0.0382) | (0.0388) |
| Observations | 7293 | 3496 | 843 | 2954 |
| $R^2$ | 0.046 | 0.046 | 0.047 | 0.071 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0121 | -0.00787 | -0.0898*** | -0.0169 |
| | (0.0197) | (0.0256) | (0.0134) | (0.0676) |
| Observations | 6605 | 3198 | 787 | 2620 |
| $R^2$ | 0.106 | 0.080 | 0.109 | 0.123 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0192 | 0.00873 | -0.0651** | -0.104** |
| | (0.0378) | (0.0565) | (0.0224) | (0.0416) |
| Observations | 7178 | 3418 | 830 | 2930 |
| $R^2$ | 0.092 | 0.081 | 0.128 | 0.168 |

## Table A25: Robustness: Dropping Former British Colonies

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.777*** | 0.0429** | 0.321*** | |
| | (0.121) | (0.0187) | (0.0936) | |
| Observations | 2676 | 2627 | 2633 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.784 | 0.097 | 0.263 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0633*** | -0.143 | 0.124** | -0.0725*** |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0967) | (0.0444) | (0.0100) |
| Observations | 2642 | 1147 | 574 | 921 |
| $R^2$ | 0.150 | 0.140 | 0.167 | 0.182 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.101*** | 0.0690 | 0.188*** | 0.117*** |
| | (0.0109) | (0.0952) | (0.0570) | (0.00677) |
| Observations | 2645 | 1147 | 577 | 921 |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | 0.185 | 0.144 | 0.138 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0 0.0542** | -0.0300 | 0.0268 | 0.0791*** |
| | (0.0241) | (0.0567) | (0.0551) | (0.00367) |
| Observations | 2606 | 1129 | 564 | 913 |
| $R^2$ | 0.180 | 0.139 | 0.119 | 0.070 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.197*** | -0.294 | -0.359*** | -0.168*** |
| | (0.0559) | (0.187) | (0.118) | (0.0321) |
| Observations | 2386 | 1047 | 461 | 878 |
| $R^2$ | 0.228 | 0.186 | 0.221 | 0.106 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.186** | -0.264 | -0.379*** | -0.109** |
| | (0.0745) | (0.188) | (0.0913) | (0.0380) |
| Observations | 2525 | 1134 | 546 | 845 |
| $R^2$ | 0.147 | 0.150 | 0.248 | 0.048 |

## Table A26: Robustness: Dropping Muslim Countries

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.500*** | 0.0551*** | 0.304*** | |
| | (0.172) | (0.0194) | (0.0833) | |
| Observations | 9274 | 9112 | 9153 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.098 | 0.241 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0285 | -0.0905* | 0.0814*** | -0.0535*** |
| | (0.0260) | (0.0455) | (0.0198) | (0.0184) |
| Observations | 9167 | 4549 | 1312 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.195 | 0.161 | 0.209 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0582*** | 0.0851*** | 0.0764** | 0.0739*** |
| | (0.0178) | (0.0314) | (0.0367) | (0.0215) |
| Observations | 9170 | 4549 | 1315 | 3306 |
| $R^2$ | 0.127 | 0.133 | 0.150 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0781*** | 0.0421 | 0.0705* | 0.0746*** |
| | (0.0190) | (0.0397) | (0.0344) | (0.00869) |
| Observations | 9116 | 4522 | 1302 | 3292 |
| $R^2$ | 0.075 | 0.065 | 0.120 | 0.069 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.127** | -0.0293 | -0.0890*** | -0.121*** |
| | (0.0519) | (0.0345) | (0.0222) | (0.0229) |
| Observations | 8276 | 4165 | 1150 | 2961 |
| $R^2$ | 0.124 | 0.092 | 0.088 | 0.226 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0813** | -0.0161 | -0.103* | -0.0831*** |
| | (0.0392) | (0.0531) | (0.0543) | (0.0226) |
| Observations | 8925 | 4449 | 1272 | 3204 |
| $R^2$ | 0.085 | 0.085 | 0.205 | 0.131 |

## Table A27: Robustness: Control for Diocese Area ($km^2$)

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0577*** | 0.340*** | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0193) | (0.0789) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9746 | 9945 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.120 | 0.237 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0391 | -0.105** | 0.0851*** | -0.0419 |
| | (0.0239) | (0.0509) | (0.0232) | (0.0260) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.205 | 0.194 | 0.173 | 0.250 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0590*** | 0.0827** | 0.0576* | 0.0604** |
| | (0.0196) | (0.0322) | (0.0323) | (0.0254) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.131 | 0.132 | 0.146 | 0.166 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0770*** | 0.0538 | 0.0587 | 0.0732*** |
| | (0.0179) | (0.0385) | (0.0417) | (0.00975) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.065 | 0.118 | 0.071 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.119** | -0.0267 | -0.0858*** | -0.0880* |
| | (0.0591) | (0.0354) | (0.0160) | (0.0445) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.114 | 0.088 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0710** | -0.00649 | -0.0615* | -0.0828*** |
| | (0.0348) | (0.0693) | (0.0356) | (0.0209) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.093 | 0.087 | 0.226 | 0.158 |

Table A28: Robustness: Dropping Observations within 1km of Border

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.494** | 0.0569** | 0.320*** | |
| | (0.188) | (0.0215) | (0.0958) | |
| Observations | 8769 | 8479 | 8656 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.760 | 0.118 | 0.234 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0297 | -0.0889 | 0.0784*** | -0.0482* |
| | (0.0287) | (0.0542) | (0.0258) | (0.0239) |
| Observations | 8671 | 4138 | 1158 | 3375 |
| $R^2$ | 0.199 | 0.187 | 0.164 | 0.245 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0555** | 0.0954** | 0.0660* | 0.0329 |
| | (0.0220) | (0.0354) | (0.0342) | (0.0400) |
| Observations | 8674 | 4138 | 1161 | 3375 |
| $R^2$ | 0.138 | 0.140 | 0.161 | 0.162 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0691*** | 0.0509 | 0.0927*** | 0.0234 |
| | (0.0216) | (0.0405) | (0.0184) | (0.0363) |
| Observations | 8613 | 4113 | 1148 | 3352 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.068 | 0.137 | 0.059 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.102* | -0.0395 | -0.0247 | -0.0679 |
| | (0.0546) | (0.0376) | (0.0283) | (0.0514) |
| Observations | 7842 | 3788 | 1012 | 3042 |
| $R^2$ | 0.114 | 0.089 | 0.089 | 0.183 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0918** | -0.0351 | -0.0377 | -0.104** |
| | (0.0354) | (0.0470) | (0.0352) | (0.0391) |
| Observations | 8448 | 4047 | 1119 | 3282 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.092 | 0.226 | 0.149 |

Table A29: Robustness: Dropping Observations within 5km of the Diocese Headquarters

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.468** | 0.0518** | 0.280** | |
| | (0.179) | (0.0197) | (0.107) | |
| Observations | 9550 | 9230 | 9427 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.675 | 0.124 | 0.224 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0388 | -0.109** | 0.0877** | -0.0587** |
| | (0.0312) | (0.0434) | (0.0332) | (0.0275) |
| Observations | 9442 | 4548 | 1378 | 3516 |
| $R^2$ | 0.203 | 0.190 | 0.174 | 0.253 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0504* | 0.0923*** | 0.0793 | 0.0377 |
| | (0.0256) | (0.0332) | (0.0531) | (0.0666) |
| Observations | 9445 | 4548 | 1381 | 3516 |
| $R^2$ | 0.125 | 0.131 | 0.144 | 0.145 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0557** | 0.0444 | 0.00638 | 0.0280 |
| | (0.0245) | (0.0478) | (0.0439) | (0.0276) |
| Observations | 9383 | 4523 | 1367 | 3493 |
| $R^2$ | 0.066 | 0.067 | 0.106 | 0.061 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.110** | -0.0269 | -0.168*** | -0.0684 |
| | (0.0458) | (0.0387) | (0.0420) | (0.0476) |
| Observations | 8495 | 4148 | 1208 | 3139 |
| $R^2$ | 0.110 | 0.090 | 0.102 | 0.195 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0938** | 0.0138 | -0.144 | -0.112*** |
| | (0.0449) | (0.0524) | (0.107) | (0.0392) |
| Observations | 9207 | 4451 | 1337 | 3419 |
| $R^2$ | 0.092 | 0.086 | 0.221 | 0.166 |

## Table A30: Robustness: Including Colonizer Fixed Effects

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.465*** | 0.0533*** | 0.274*** | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0197) | (0.0904) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9746 | 9945 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.122 | 0.232 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0343 | -0.0869* | 0.0857*** | -0.0484** |
| | (0.0224) | (0.0442) | (0.0202) | (0.0196) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.205 | 0.193 | 0.174 | 0.249 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0603*** | 0.0843*** | 0.0698** | 0.0301 |
| | (0.0201) | (0.0309) | (0.0309) | (0.0450) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.133 | 0.132 | 0.145 | 0.159 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | 0.0519*** | 0.0415 | 0.0545 | 0.0499* |
| | (0.0186) | (0.0390) | (0.0389) | (0.0250) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.075 | 0.068 | 0.120 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0741** | -0.0212 | -0.0896*** | -0.0907** |
| | (0.0280) | (0.0329) | (0.0263) | (0.0405) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.124 | 0.089 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Headquarters | -0.0765** | -0.0118 | -0.0879* | -0.110*** |
| | (0.0356) | (0.0550) | (0.0444) | (0.0290) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.096 | 0.089 | 0.225 | 0.156 |

## Table A31: Robustness: Controlling for Log Distance to Pre-Colonial State

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.465*** | 0.0465** | 0.204*** | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0216) | (0.0767) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9746 | 9945 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.120 | 0.235 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.00939 | -0.0805 | 0.0816*** | -0.0311* |
| | (0.0263) | (0.0489) | (0.0195) | (0.0171) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.193 | 0.175 | 0.250 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0409 | 0.0863** | 0.0736** | -0.0146 |
| | (0.0264) | (0.0341) | (0.0354) | (0.0486) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.132 | 0.146 | 0.163 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0739*** | 0.0510 | 0.0638* | 0.0452 |
| | (0.0243) | (0.0381) | (0.0355) | (0.0323) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.066 | 0.118 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0791* | -0.00682 | -0.0926*** | -0.0759 |
| | (0.0411) | (0.0295) | (0.0232) | (0.0683) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.116 | 0.091 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0993** | -0.0144 | -0.110* | -0.142** |
| | (0.0485) | (0.0524) | (0.0539) | (0.0505) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.220 | 0.156 |

## Table A32: Robustness: Including Pre-Colonial State Fixed Effects

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.416*** | 0.0491** | 0.255*** | |
| | (0.154) | (0.0191) | (0.0758) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9746 | 9945 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.122 | 0.232 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0182 | -0.0788* | 0.0753*** | -0.0420** |
| | (0.0253) | (0.0466) | (0.0200) | (0.0198) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.205 | 0.195 | 0.174 | 0.251 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0510** | 0.0923*** | 0.0804** | 0.0282 |
| | (0.0209) | (0.0329) | (0.0318) | (0.0499) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.132 | 0.134 | 0.149 | 0.163 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0746*** | 0.0420 | 0.0793** | 0.0540* |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0394) | (0.0368) | (0.0303) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.072 | 0.066 | 0.128 | 0.067 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.103** | -0.00855 | -0.0889*** | -0.0888* |
| | (0.0476) | (0.0254) | (0.0259) | (0.0448) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.118 | 0.091 | 0.097 | 0.202 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0877** | 0.00392 | -0.122** | -0.101*** |
| | (0.0368) | (0.0509) | (0.0525) | (0.0358) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.096 | 0.094 | 0.224 | 0.159 |

## Table A33: Robustness: Controlling for Distance to Waterways

| **Panel A:** Missionary Presence, Religious identity, and Schooling | (1) Catholic Missions Within 50 km | (2) Catholic Today | (3) Schooling Ordinal | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.465*** | 0.0518*** | 0.271*** | |
| | (0.164) | (0.0183) | (0.0844) | |
| Observations | 10070 | 9746 | 9945 | |
| $R^2$ | 0.755 | 0.120 | 0.232 | |
| **Panel B:** Index of Political Participation | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0209 | -0.0566 | 0.0819*** | -0.0482** |
| | (0.0267) | (0.0384) | (0.0146) | (0.0188) |
| Observations | 9961 | 4652 | 1418 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.204 | 0.196 | 0.184 | 0.249 |
| **Panel C:** Index of socio-political status and interest in politics | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0455** | 0.0739*** | 0.0743** | 0.0243 |
| | (0.0184) | (0.0264) | (0.0356) | (0.0423) |
| Observations | 9964 | 4652 | 1421 | 3891 |
| $R^2$ | 0.130 | 0.133 | 0.146 | 0.160 |
| **Panel D:** Index of Support for Democratic Institutions | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | 0.0710*** | 0.0445 | 0.0639* | 0.0497** |
| | (0.0203) | (0.0354) | (0.0352) | (0.0226) |
| Observations | 9899 | 4625 | 1407 | 3867 |
| $R^2$ | 0.070 | 0.065 | 0.118 | 0.066 |
| **Panel E:** Satisfied with Democracy | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.109* | 0.00700 | -0.0926*** | -0.0928** |
| | (0.0553) | (0.0329) | (0.0239) | (0.0428) |
| Observations | 8991 | 4245 | 1248 | 3498 |
| $R^2$ | 0.114 | 0.090 | 0.097 | 0.198 |
| **Panel F:** Index of Incumbent Performance and Support | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocracies |
| Proximity to Diocese Head | -0.0945** | -0.0161 | -0.110* | -0.115*** |
| | (0.0361) | (0.0485) | (0.0546) | (0.0275) |
| Observations | 9703 | 4552 | 1376 | 3775 |
| $R^2$ | 0.091 | 0.086 | 0.222 | 0.156 |

Table A34: Correlation Between Education/Missionary Activity and Index of Political Participation

| *Panel A: Education* | *Dependent Variable: Index of Political Participation* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
| Secondary completed | 0.0295*** | -0.00935 | 0.0956*** | 0.0595*** |
| | (0.00658) | (0.00902) | (0.0166) | (0.0117) |
| Observations | 53065 | 30136 | 6819 | 16110 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.171 | 0.168 | 0.197 |
| Country FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| AB Round FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean of Outcome | 0.00576 | 0.0484 | -0.182 | 0.00543 |
| SD of Outcome | 0.684 | 0.679 | 0.661 | 0.689 |
| Min of Outcome | -1.705 | -1.606 | -1.705 | -1.657 |
| Max of Outcome | 1.915 | 1.915 | 1.720 | 1.915 |
| *Panel B: Missionary Activity* | *Dependent Variable: Index of Political Participation* | | | |
| | (1) Pooled | (2) Democracies | (3) Open Anocracies | (4) Closed Anocarcies |
| Number of Catholic Missions | -0.0207*** | -0.0210*** | 0.0262** | -0.0255*** |
| | (0.00271) | (0.00464) | (0.0110) | (0.00349) |
| Observations | 53161 | 30197 | 6845 | 16119 |
| $R^2$ | 0.181 | 0.171 | 0.164 | 0.199 |
| Country FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| AB Round FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Mean of Outcome | 0.00548 | 0.0480 | -0.182 | 0.00525 |
| SD of Outcome | 0.683 | 0.678 | 0.661 | 0.689 |
| Min of Outcome | -1.705 | -1.606 | -1.705 | -1.657 |
| Max of Outcome | 1.915 | 1.915 | 1.720 | 1.915 |

*Notes:* This table presents results using a simple OLS specification with the index of political participation as the outcome variable, a measure of education or missionary activity as the dependent variable, as well as controlling for the respondent's age and gender and including country and Afrobarometer Round fixed effects. Panel A uses whether the respondent has completed secondary school as the explanatory variable. Panel B uses the number of Catholic Missions within 50 km of the respondent as the explanatory variable. The sample includes all observations within 50 km of dioceses' border *circa* 1928. The dependent variable is an index which combines whether the respondent Voted, Contacted Local Councilor, Attended a Community Meeting and Raised an Issue. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$