Research

The Local Memory of Repression and Who Fights. (with Connor Huff) 2024. World Politics. 76(2):219–258

Abstract

How does the local memory of past repression affect whether individuals fight for, or rebel against, the government perpetrator? We theorize how information about past repression is transmitted across generations over time to shape long-run patterns of loyalty and rebellion toward the state. We assess this argument by studying how the legacies of the 1845–1849 Irish Famine affected the decisions of subsequent generations of Irishmen to fight for or against Britain. Leveraging data on over 150,000 Irish combatants, we show that individuals in places more severely affected by the Famine fought in the pro-British Irish Militia and the WW1 British military at lower rates. By contrast, they rebelled against Britain at higher rates. Additional quantitative analysis provides evidence consistent with the theoretical argument: constituencies more severely affected by the Famine voted for the pro-Irish and anti-British Sinn Fein party at higher rates. Our paper demonstrates how the local memory of past repression can play a crucial role in shaping long-run patterns of conflict participation behavior.

Complements or Substitutes? How Institutional Arrangements Bind Chiefs and the State in Africa. 2023. American Political Science Review. 117(3):871–890.

Abstract

How does the central state interact with local actors in providing public goods? I study the effect of state capacity on local governance in sub-Saharan Africa, which I argue depends on whether traditional village chiefs are integrated in the country’s constitution. I use distance to administrative headquarters as a measure of state capacity and estimate a regression discontinuity design around administrative boundaries. If chiefs are not integrated then the state and chiefs compete with each other, working as substitutes. That is, a stronger state undermines the power of chiefs. If traditional chiefs are integrated, then the two work as complements. A stronger state then increases the power of chiefs. I show that these relationships are crucial to understand the effect of the capacity of the state on local economic development.

Coverage: Development Impact, ThisWeekinAfrica

Africa’s Latent Assets. (with James A. Robinson) 2023. Journal of African Economies, Volume 32:i9–i32.

Abstract

Despite the past centuries' economic setbacks and challenges, are there reasons for optimism about Africa's economic prospects? We provide a conceptual framework and empirical evidence that show how the nature of African society has led to three sets of unrecognized "latent assets." First, success in African society is talent driven and Africa has experienced high levels of perceived and actual social mobility. A society where talented individuals rise to the top and optimism prevails is an excellent basis for entrepreneurship and innovation. Second, Africans, like westerners who built the world's most successful effective states, are highly skeptical of authority and attuned to the abuse of power. We argue that these attitudes can be a critical basis for building better institutions. Third, Africa is "cosmopolitan." Africans are the most multilingual people in the world, have high levels of religious tolerance, and are welcoming to strangers. The experience of navigating cultural and linguistic diversity sets Africans up for success in a globalized world.

Coverage: Brookings, Global Prosperity Institute, LSE Business Review, Marginal Revolution, ThisWeekinAfrica, VoxEU

Monopoly of Taxation Without a Monopoly of Violence: The Weak State's Trade-Offs From Taxation. (with Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, Miguel Ortiz, Raul Sanchez de la Sierra, and David Qihang Wu) 2023. Accepted, Review of Economic Studies.

Abstract

This study presents a new economic perspective on state-building based on a case study in the Democratic Republic of the Congo's hinterland. We explore the implications for the state of considering rebels as stationary bandits. When the state, through a military operation, made it impossible for rebels to levy taxes, it inadvertently encouraged them to plunder the assets of the very citizens they previously preferred to tax. When it negotiated with rebels instead, this effect was absent, but negotiating compromised the state's legitimacy and prompted the emergence of new rebels. The findings suggest that attempting to increase taxation by a weak state in the hinterland could come at the expense of safety in the medium term and of the integrity of the state in the long term.

Missionary Competition, Education, and Long-run Political Development: Evidence Across Regime Types in Africa. (with Horacio Larreguy and Carlos Schmidt-Padilla) Revise & Resubmit, Comparative Political Studies.

Abstract

In Africa, missionaries used schooling to gain adherents. We study how historical missionary activity shaped long-run education and political development across regime types. We exploit plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to Catholic missionaries generated by their territorial administration system. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that proximity to historical diocese headquarters generally led to an increased presence of Catholic missionaries, as well as long-term positive effects on Catholic identity and educational outcomes. The effects on political outcomes vary by regime type. Only individuals exposed to greater historical missionary activity in open anocracies—relative to those in democracies and closed anocracies—are more likely to participate in politics. Moreover, they are also the only ones who are more engaged, supportive of democratic institutions, and disenchanted with the state of democracy and incumbent in their countries.

Coverage: Global Prosperity Institute

Seeing like a Citizen: Experimental Evidence on How Empowerment Affects Engagement with the State. (with Laura Paler, Wilson Prichard, Cyrus Samii, and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra) Revise & Resubmit, American Journal of Political Science.

Abstract

Building a strong and effective state requires revenue. Yet, in many low-income countries, citizens forego engaging with the state because of vulnerability to opportunistic demands by state agents. We study two randomized interventions in Kinshasa, DRC designed to empower citizens: one provided information about statutory payment obligations and another offered protection from abusive officials. Testing predictions from a model, we examine the effects of empowerment not only on citizen payment amounts (intensive margin effects) but also on whether citizens start making formal payments, or any payments, to the state (extensive margin effects). We find that protection, but not information had clear extensive margin effects, increasing the share of citizens making formal payments and engaging with the state in the first place. Overall, we show how empowering citizens can help countries transition away from a low-tax, high-informality equilibrium.

State Expansion and Social Responses in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. (with Vincent Tanutama)

Abstract

This paper shows that the expansion of a weak state can increase citizens' demand for state governance and displace existing actors. We study a reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that extends state authority, via a population threshold, to small towns previously governed by traditional chiefs. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that state expansion increased citizens' demand for the state even when such an expansion is fraught. Towns above the population threshold have more state appointed personnel, public goods provision, and state security personnel, but little improvements in capacity or infrastructure. State expansion also leads to increased conflict between the state and traditional chiefs, especially around property rights. Citizens increasingly turn to the state when resolving disputes, make more tax payments and bribe payments. This increased demand for the state comes at the expense of demand for traditional authority. In public goods games citizens affected by state expansion are more likely to contribute to the common pool when hearing messages from state officials while citizens in unaffected villages react to messages by traditional leaders. Our results suggest that a weak state can extend its capacity and capture society via political competition.

(Wartime) Indirect Rule: Armed Groups and Customary Chiefs in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. (with Gauthier Marchais and Raul Sanchez de la Sierra) Under Review.

Abstract

Armed actors frequently govern civilian populations. To do so they can develop their own administration (direct rule) or enlist pre-existing authorities (indirect rule). To study these configurations, we collect data on 249 episodes of armed group governance in 106 villages in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, spanning the reigns of 306 chiefs over 26 years. We develop multidimensional measures of chief power and of governance arrangements by armed groups. Using variation within armed groups and between villages and chiefs, we document three empirical facts. First, chief power includes spiritual, customary, material, and managerial power. Second, armed groups are more likely to choose indirect rule when chiefs are powerful. Third, over time armed groups tend to develop direct rule the longer they control a village. These results suggest indirect rule is a temporary governance configuration by armed groups to leverage the legitimacy of local leaders.

How Unobserved Investments Inhibit Public Service Delivery Improvement in Corrupt Environments. (with Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall) Under Review.

Abstract

Poor local public service delivery is common across the Global South. We argue that the short-term unobservability of investments to improve service delivery combine with adverse selection to weaken incentives for politicians to make such investments. While audits that certify investments can mitigate this monitoring problem, the certification process's effectiveness can be undermined by corruptible politicians and certifiers. We test this argument using a Mexican program designed to certify service delivery investments, where certifications are self-assessed by municipal governments and validated by corruptible third-party institutions. Difference-in-differences estimates show that the program did not ultimately improve municipal public service delivery on average. Consistent with our model, this effect is only positive when the third party is unlikely to be corruptible and when the likelihood that the incumbent is not corruptible in producing the service is large. These findings highlight the challenges in improving service delivery and the importance of incentive-compatible monitoring.

Decentralization in a Weak State. (with Aimable Amani Lameke, Christian Mastaki Mugaruka, and Vincent Tanutama)

Abstract

What characterizes local governance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? This paper provides descriptive evidence to describe and quantify the local organization of the state in 134 rural small towns and large villages in four provinces of the DRC. We present rich data on state and local governance, taxation, public good provision, and citizens’ perceptions of governance. Three stories emerge. First, contrary to the failed state image, the Congolese state has a significant presence in the rural localities surveyed and demonstrates a high level of administrative capacity. Second, we present the hierarchical organization of state agents and the relative independence of traditional chiefs. Third, we identify key challenges in local governance, namely lack of democratic accountability, high levels of corruption, and an acute lack of financing.

Can Social Contact Reduce Economic Conflict between Farmers and Herders? Evidence from Nigeria. (with Oeindrila Dube and James A. Robinson)

Kinship and Trust. (with Jingyue Lei and James A. Robinson)

Coexistence and Conflict: Lessons from Africa. (with James A. Robinson)

The Effect of Drug-related Violence on Local State Capacity. (with Horacio Larreguy and John Marshall)

The Electoral Consequences of Decentralization Reform in the DRC. (with Vincent Tanutama)